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Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in
International Administration
David Zaring*
I. INTRODUCTION
Administration has, in many of its most important subject areas, become
internationalized. This transformation has removed the regulation of goods and
services from domestic rulemaking and transformed it into a matter for
supranational agreement. It has taken review away from the courts and made
administration an exercise in bureaucratic collaboration.
And it has occurred quiedy-not through laws passed by legislatures,
treaties agreed to by executives, or mandates lain down by international
organizations such as the United Nations. Instead, the internationalization of
regulation has happened informally, and the primary impetus for its
development has been domestic bureaucracies themselves.'
Even though areas of rulemaking that affect millions of people have
changed, the phenomenon, as a form of procedure, remains largely
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unexamined.2 It is not a part of administrative law syllabi, nor is it taught in
many international law courses. Scholars have examined particular areas of
harmonization with an eye to their substance while neglecting their process, and
efforts to look at global administrative practice as a coherent body of lawmaking
are still nascent.3
As for international lawyers, they now recognize that this bureaucratic
collaboration exists and have sensed its potential. But they have not drawn any
confident conclusions about how the organizations might evolve.
In this article, I seek not just to site regulatory cooperation in the
framework of international rulemaking, but also to identify the direction in
which this cooperation might be going. I go into detail about the types of rules
generated by the phenomenon, and I analyze some of its successes. I also
identify the real problems with the phenomenon. The problems do not lie, as
many observers have argued, with a democratic deficit and a bias in favor of the
United States-at least not as those problems are usually defined. Rights of
participation in informal international rulemaking are afforded rather broadly
across the First World. However, developing countries enjoyed much more
limited access, and it is in the developed/developing divide that informal
regulatory cooperation is at its perhaps most problematic.
These problems, as well as successes, arise from the way that regulatory
cooperative organizations make rules. The entities, although they began as
informal regimes, have developed into recognizable forms of international
administration over the last decade.
Call it hard and soft international administrative procedure. I interpret the
phrase broadly to cover the three principal achievements of international
regulatory cooperation-at least in my case study. These achievements range
from hard procedural law to soft harmonization-through-example. They include:
1) hard international rules that constrain financial institutions in developed
2 In addition to Anne-Marie Slaughter, Kal Raustiala has successfully avoided this problem. See, for
example, Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the
Future of International Law, 43 Va J Ind L 2 (2002); Kal Raustiala, Conpliance & Effectiveness in
International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 Case W Res J Ind L 387, 399, 409-11 (2000) (discussing
liberal theories that disaggregate the state into a series of substate actors).
3 One happy exception to this rule may be found at NYU Law School, where Benedict Kingsbury
and Dick Stewart have started a program designed to explore the dimensions and theory of global
administrative law. See Benedict Kingsbury, Richard B. Stewart, and Nico Krisch, Administrative
Law and Global Governance: Research Project Outline, Colloquium, Globalism and Its Discontents (Spring
2004), available online at <http://www.law.nyu.edu/kingsburyb/spring04/globalization/
program.html> (visited Nov 18, 2004) (considering various specific aspects of a global
administrative law). See also Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Tweno-First Century, 78
NYU L Rev 437, 455 (2003).
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countries; 2) softer principles of supervision that bureaucrats in developing
countries may emulate; and 3) models for regulators in adjacent issue areas.
Nowhere is internationalization of administration more clear than in the
area of financial regulation. Agencies like the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") and the Federal Reserve Board now play roles as
international lawmakers, and, in turn, are increasingly constrained by
international agreement. Some observers think the informal agreements that
these agencies have made over the past two decades limited the spread and
impact of the international financial crises of the past ten years.4 Others believe
that those agreements contributed to the worldwide recession of the early
1990s.,
I study two of these international financial regulatory organizations (I call
them, perhaps inelegantly, "IFROs") as my principal examples because of the
length of their pedigrees and the high level of their accomplishments.6 The Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision ("Basle Committee') and the International
Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"), both began in the 1970s,
are important players in both international and American financial regulation,
and now participate in a number of second-generation IFROs that have been
formed in their image.
Of course, financial regulatory cooperation is but one example of an
informal international phenomenon. Similar regulatory cooperation in antitrust,7
4 See text accompanying note 58.
5 See text accompanying notes 59-60.
6 I have written about these organizations before. See generally David Zaring, International Law by
Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 Tex Ind L J
281 (1998). I have also considered a domestic variant of cross-jurisdictional regulatory
cooperation, focusing on horizontal connections between trial courts that can create uniform
national standards. See generally David Zaring, National Rulemaking through Trial Courts: The Big
Case and Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L Rev 1015 (2004).
The International Competition Network ("ICN") is the mechanism for regulatory cooperation
most like the Basle Committee and IOSCO. It is "focused on improving worldwide cooperation
and enhancing convergence through dialogue." See ICN, About Us, available online at
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/aboutus.html> (visited Nov 8, 2004). In the
network, "[m]embership is voluntary and open to any national or multinational competition
authority entrusted with the enforcement of antitrust laws." Id. For a particularly helpful
discussion of other aspects of regulatory cooperation in antitrust, and a call for the selective
internationalization of the field, see Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatoy Federalism Races Up,
Down, and Sideways, 75 NYU L Rev 1781, 1785-87, 1802-07 (2000). For recent discussions of
antitrust cooperation, see Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study of
International Antitrust Regulation, 39 Stan J Intl L 207 (2003); Julian Epstein, The Other Side of
Harmony: Can Trade and Competition Laws Work Together in the International Markeoplace?, 17 Am U Intl
L Rev 343, 358-59 (2002).
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food and drug regulation,8 telecommunications,9 aviation, 0 and other areas has
resulted in an epidemic of standardization. Joseph Weiler calls this cooperation
a "fourth strata" in the geology of international law, a layer of the field in which
informal regulatory regimes and self-regulating governance mechanisms-rather
than treaties, formal international organizations,. or diplomats-predominate. 2
It is in attempting to adopt hard rules that we see the escalating procedural
formality of these organizations-their first principle achievement. I take, by
way of example of this process, the Basle Committee's revision of its capital
adequacy accord, which governs the reserve levels of most of the banks in the
world. I argue that the additional process offered by the committee as it has
revised the accord-which is dramatically different from the process it used only
8 The Codex Alimentarius Commission is one of the primary, but not only, organizations around
which labeling and food safety standards are harmonized. See generally Codex Alimentarius,
Welcome, available online at <http://www.codexalimentarius.net> (visited Nov 8, 2004). The
Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Agriculture both send representatives to
the Codex process, with the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service in charge of
coordinating the participation of American regulators. See USDA, Food Safety and Inspection
Service, Regulations and Policies, available online at <http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/codex/>
(visited Nov 8, 2004). For a perspective on the involvement of the Codex commission and other
international regulatory efforts with the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, see
generally David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitagy Agreement of the World Trade OrganiZation: An
Assessment After Five Years, 32 NYU J Ind L & Pol 865 (2000). For an overview of other
harmonization projects from the perspective of the FDA, see generally Sharon Smith Holston, An
Overview of International Cooperation, 52 Food & Drug L J 197 (1997). See also Joseph G. Contrera,
The Food and Drug Administration and the International Conference on Harmonization: How HarmoniZed
Will International Pharmaceutical Regulations Becomel, 8 Admin L J Am U 927 (1995); Rosemarie
Kanusky, Pharmaceutical Harmonization: Standardiing Regulations among the United States, the European
Economic Communiy, and Japan, 16 Houston J Ind L 665, 667 (1994); David W. Jordan, International
Regulatory Harmonization: A New Era in Prescrption Drug Approval, 25 Vand J Transnad L 471, 491
(1992).
9 For a brief overview of interactions between US and EU regulatory authorities in
telecommunications regulatory cooperation, see George A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation between
the European Commission and U.S. Administrative Agendes, 9 Admin L J Am U 933, 968 (1996).
10 See George A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation with Counterpart Agencies Abroad: The FAA's Aircraft
Certification Experience, 24 L & Poly in Intl Bus 669, 774 (1993).
11 See Stewart, 78 NYU L Rev at 455 (cited in note 3).
Such coordination helps to reduce barriers to trade and commerce created by
differing national regulations and to address transnational regulatory problems
that exceed purely domestic capabilities. For example, national regulators may
agree to accept each others' product regulatory standards as mutually
equivalent or pool information and coordinate antitrust measures with the
practices of multinational firms.
Id.
12 Joseph Weiler, Towards a Geology of 20tb Century International Law: The Paradox of Law Making and
Enforcement, Address at Duke Law School (Feb 12, 2001), quoted in Don Suh, Note, Situating
Liberalism in Transnational Legal Space, 12 Duke J Comp & Ind L 605, 612 (2002).
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a few years earlier-is due to a self-imposed interest in attaining legifimag for
committee regulation.
The second principal achievement of these organizations is a softer one of
proselytization. I show how IFROs spread unobjectionable, easy-to-adopt (for
already sophisticated regulators, at least) standards throughout the developing
world. I use, as an example, IOSCO's primary achievement thus far: the
promulgation of uniform principles of securities supervision. In some ways this
proselytization represents a "best practices" approach to harmonization that is
almost dialectical in its purity. Practices are compared and debated at
organization meetings, after which the most attractive ones are selected and then
recommended to regulators across the globe. In other ways, because these
practices are devised by the developed world and spread to the developing
world, the proselytization achievement of IFROs is, as Jonathan Macey puts it,
nakedly imperialistic. 3
Third, IOSCO and the Basle Committee have begotten a hoard of similar
IFROs. They also have served as the host for a large number of bilateral
arrangements between regulators. I sketch some of these successor organizations
and arrangements briefly, to give readers a sense of the breadth of their
development. While some observers might conclude that the proliferation of
imitators of the Basle Committee and IOSCO amounts to little more than the
meaningless colonization of increasingly scarce regulatory acronyms, I cautiously
turn to neofunctional theory to explain the phenomenon.14 That theory predicts
a congealing of international actors through a progressive enmeshment in
transborder cooperation. I argue that neofunctionalism can provide us with
some insights into why these developments in regulatory cooperation might
offer the most important long-range implications for the nature and
development of an international system of administration.
In Part II of this article, I describe the origins and structure of the Basle
Committee and IOSCO. As we will see, both IFROs look rather nontraditional
to both classically trained international lawyers and to domestic administrative
law practitioners used to formal agency process. As Benedict Kingsbury has put
it, the ways that regulators interact with one another and with other actors in
international life "are not well captured in standard international legal typologies
(e.g., the sharp sources-based distinction often drawn between binding and non-
binding norms)."' 5 Nor are domestic analogies, which turn on the important
13 Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatogy Globalizaion as a Response to Regulatory Competiion, 52 Emory L J
1353, 1353-54 (2003).
14 See text accompanying notes 216-22.
15 Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Compeling Conceptions of International
Law, 19 MichJ Ind L 345, 368 (1998).
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roles played by legislatures and courts, well-suited to an international system that
has a strong version of neither.16
For example, the Basle Committee and JOSCO were founded by regulators
themselves, who comprise the entirety of the membership. 7 They are
informal-governed not by treaties or treaty-type documents, but instead by
unconstraining and flexible bylaws. They are decentralized, claim small budgets,
and permit regulators from the wealthiest countries to play outsized roles in the
development of rules; therefore, there is none of the formal equality that marks
the United Nations or other mid-twentieth century international organizations
like it. The organizations have traditionally been secretive, but, at least in the
case of the Basle Committee and IOSCO, have recently found it difficult to
remain so.
In my descriptions of these organizations, I pay particular attention to how
their efforts have been received by American regulators. I do so because, as Dick
Stewart has put it, "The future evolution of administrative law in the United
States must also confront the international aspects of regulation, a subject that
will assume great significance in the coming decades."1"
So the Basle Committee, IOSCO, and their kin in other regulatory areas,
are not typical agencies, 9 nor typical international organizations.20 In part III of
16 See Stewart, 78 NYU L Rev at 459 (cited in note 3).
The challenge posed to administrative law by regulatory governance is
significandy greater in the international than in the domestic context.
Domestically, regulatory agencies generally operate at one remove from
elected legislatures. As we have seen, a central issue for administrative law is
how to ground the administrative exercise of regulatory authority in electorally
based representative government. International regulatory networks and
organizations operate at an even further remove and involve many nations as
well as nonstate actors.
Id.
17 With a caveat: IOSCO permits members to be self-regulatory organizations, such as stock
exchanges, in the absence of (or, on occasion, in tandem with) a government regulator. It also
permits affiliate membership of organizations that include members of the regulated industry. See
IOSCO, App&ations for Membership, available online at <http://www.iosco.org/about/
about.cfm.?whereami=page6> (visited Nov 8, 2004).
18 Stewart, 78 NYU L Rev at 455 (cited in note 3).
19 It is not my intention here to define with precision what a "proper" agency is (such an effort
would be unhappily formalistic), except to note that the intergovernmental organizations offered
by the Basle Committee and IOSCO do not resemble the bureaucracies that compose their
membership in size, budget, rulemaking procedure, statutory guidance, and so on. Of course,
under the traditional conception of American administrative law, "agencies" have been defined
broadly. The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") simply adopted the term "agency" to mean
"each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to
review by another agency," with the exception of Congress, the courts, the governments of the
"territories or possessions of the United States" and the Armed Forces, among others. See 5 USC
551(1) (1994). The Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA' further clarified the APA's definition
Vol. 5 No. 2
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this article, I identify the paradigmatic ways in which these organizations
operate.
Finally, in part IV, I conclude with some observations about what IFROs
mean to theories of international regulation. As I explain, their existence is yet
another vindication for the disaggregated approach to international law taken by
liberal theorists such as Anne-Marie Slaughter.2 ' However, in practice, the
agencies that enjoy their own subjectivity in the international arena certainly act
consistently with rationalist paradigms of regime theory.
I also engage the recent controversy over the vibrancy of "soft law" raised
by writers such as Kal Raustiala and Andrew Guzman.2 IFROs would seem to
epitomize soft law, and their existence suggests that the concept may retain
some value-but not if it is inseparable from high degrees of compliance that
the consensus-based organizations enjoy.
I conclude with some brief observations about what regulatory cooperation
might mean in a world with both a hegemonic power and with persistent
concerns about the democratic deficit inherent in international agreement-
particularly in the informal form of international agreement practiced by IFROs.
I argue that IFROs offer some good news to those concerned about both issues.
A caveat: in this article, I focus on the lawlike rules and institutions
generated by IFROs (and consider the implications thereof for administrative
practice more generally). But formal rules and institutions are not the only
products generated by international regulatory cooperation. The organizations
provide informal introductions and access to regulators, and generate advice
of agency-at least for the purposes of the open information law. FOIA defined "agency" to
include "any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government
controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government
(including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency." See 5
USC § 552(0 (1994). See also 5 USC § 2302(a)(2)(C) (1994) ( "[Algency," for the purposes of
labor law, "means an Executive agency and the Government Printing Office," with a list of
exceptions, most related to national security.). Courts have long tried to avoid defining the term.
See, for example, Washington Research Project v Department of Healtb, Education, and Welfare, 504 F2d
238, 245-46 (DC Cir 1974) ("[R]ecent cases have made it clear that any general definition can be
of only limited utility to a court confronted with one of the myriad organizational arrangements
for getting the business of government done.").
20 For a discussion of the usual legal prerequisites of international organizations, see text
accompanying notes 111-18.
21 See, for example, Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theoy
and the Future of The United Nations, 4 Transnad L & Contemp Probs 377, 409 (1994) ("State
authority can be disaggregated into distinct institutions performing specific governmental
functions: legislative, executive, and judicial. Each of these sub-entities interacts with individuals
and groups that are self-consciously part of transnational society.").
22 See text accompanying notes 233-35.
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through the publication of reports and surveys.23 I have discussed these
interesting aspects of cooperation elsewhere; here I focus on the more
administrative and procedural products of the process of regulatory
cooperation.24
II. THE ORGANIZATIONS THEMSELVES: Two CASE STUDIES
AND A MODEL
In this section, I describe the organizations, and trace their extremely
informal origins to their more established and bureaucratic present. My aim is to
describe how organizations like IFROs usually operate; what follows will be an
accordingly technical investigation into the structure and rulemaking functions
of the organizations, followed by a more general descriptive typology of their
genus. This typology can serve as a model of international regulatory
cooperation.
23 Both the Basle Committee and the IOSCO, in addition to serving as models for other
organizations, set the groundwork for other agreements between regulations, commonly known
as Memoranda of Understanding ("MOUs'". MOUs are agreements between regulators; the
IOSCO collects them. See IOSCO, Memoranda of Understanding, available online at
<http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfmwhereami=mou> (visited Nov 8, 2004). It has also
recently issued a framework for MOUs between securities regulators. See IOSCO, Multilateral
Memorandum of Understanding: Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information
(May 2002), available online at <http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfmwhereami-
pubdocs&publicDoclD=126> (visited Nov 8, 2004). The United Nations Treaty Reference
Guide sets forth basic definitions of the "international instruments binding at international law:
treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda of understanding,
modus vivendi, and exchange of notes." See United Nations Treaty Collection, Treaty Reference
Guide, available online at <http://untreaty.un.org/English/guide.asp> (visited Nov 8, 2004).
IOSCO is particularly active in this regard. It serves as a forum in which bilateral MOUs on
information sharing or other supervisory issues may be concluded. Hundreds of these MOUs
have been drafted under the organization's auspices, and it has formed a repository for them. For
a complete list of these MOUs, see <http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfmwhereami=mou>
(visited Sept 14, 2004). The Basle Committee has "always encouraged contacts and cooperation
between its members and other banking supervisory authorities." BIS, The Basle Committee on
Banking Supertision, available online at <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm> (visited Nov
8, 2004). It has also suggested that its members enter into MOUs with other banking supervisors.
See BIS, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Supenisory Guidance on Dealing with Weak Banks
16, 59 (Mar 2002), available online at <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs88.pdf#xml=http://
search.atomz.com/search/pdfhelper.tk?sp-o= 19,100000,0> (visited Nov 8, 2004).
24 See Zaring, 33 Tex Ind L J at 281 (cited in note 6).
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A. THE BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION
Prompted by three large international bank failures in 1974,25 the central
bank governors of the Group of Ten Countries (G-10), Luxembourg, and
Switzerland agreed to establish the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision.26
The central bankers declared, via a press release, that the primary purpose of the
committee would be to provide its members with a regular forum for discussing
cooperative approaches to the supervision of multinational banks.2i Since its
founding, the committee, pursuant to this mandate, has served both as the venue
for the exchange of information about supervisory practices and as the
mechanism for the promulgation of hard standards to which all members of the
committee must subscribe.
The Basle Committee's organizational structure is fluid, and it acts
informally. It rotates its chairmanship and operates through consensus.
2 8
Although the committee has recently held a number of comment periods for
matters related to the revision of its capital accord, it has not subjected itself to
open-meeting requirements or submitted its promulgations for review by an
international adjudicative tribunal.2 9  It has traditionally maintained a low
profile.3" As former committee chairman Huib J. Muller observed, "[w]e don't
like publicity. We prefer, I might say, our hidden secret world of the supervisory
25 On June 26, 1974, German regulators forced the Bank Herstatt into liquidation, which left
without remedy a number of banks that had released payment of marks to Herstatt in Frankfurt
in exchange for dollars that were to be delivered in New York. See Riskglossary.com, Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision, available online at <http://www.riskglossary.com/articles/
basle committee.htm> (visited Nov 8, 2004). The British-Israel Bank, based in the United
Kingdom, and the Franklin National Bank, based in the United States, also failed. Ethan B.
Kapstein, Superdsing International Banks: Origins and Implications of the Basle Accord 4-5 (Princeton
1991) (discussing the history surrounding the establishment of the Basle Committee).
26 The Committee's members come from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United
States. See BIS, The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, available online at
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ aboutbcbs.htm> (cited in note 23).
27 See BIS, Press Communiqu6 (Feb 12, 1975); Joseph J. Norton, Trends in International Bank
Supervision and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 48 Consumer Fin L Q 415, 415 n 1 (1994).
28 Joseph J. Norton, Pivati7ation of Public Pension Systems in Developing Nations: A Call for International
Standards, 64 Brooklyn L Rev 817, 857 (1998); Tony Porter, States, Markets, and Regimes in Global
Finance 66 (St Martin's 1993).
29 As one employee of the Federal Reserve Board said, "Mhe Basle Committee is not subject to any
administrative procedure" requirements. Interview with a Staff Attorney, Federal Reserve Board
(Jan 9, 2004).
30 See Zaring, 33 Tex Intl L J at 288-89 (cited in note 6). See also Joseph Jude Norton, Devising
International Bank Supervisory Standards 177 (Kluwer 1995).
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continent.",31 In fact, the details of the Basle Committee's 1975 founding
agreement were not released to the public until more than five years after their
adoption.32
Times have changed-to some extent. Now the committee publicly
circulates many of its decisions, as well as research conducted under its aegis,
although it has been cagey about detailing its governing instruments.3 3 However,
its meetings, which occur four times per year in Basle, remain closed to the
public 34 (although the committee has adopted the practice of issuing ex post
brief press releases describing the approximate agenda of these gatherings). 35 It
has also announced the opening of comment periods on consultative
documents, also by press release, accompanied by a rough schedule for further
action.3 6
31 Huib J. Muller, Address to International Conference of Bank Supervisors (May 16, 1988), quoted
in Porter, States, Markets, and Regimes in Global Finance at 66 (cited in note 28).
32 See GAO, International Banking: Strengthening the Framework for Supervising International Banks 41 (Mar
1994), available online at <http://161.203.16.4/t2pbat4/151053.pdf> (visited Nov 8, 2004).
33 The Committee's website makes this clear. See, for example, BIS, Basel Committee publications,
available online at <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ.htm> (visited Nov 8, 2004). See also Heath
Price Tarbert, Rethinking CapitalAdequagy: The Basle Accord and the New Framework, 56 Bus Law 767,
781 (2001) ("Most publications and Consultative Papers are available to the members of the
general public via the Basle Committee's portion of the Bank of International Settlements's
Internet site.").
34 Zaring, 33 Tex Intl L J at 288 (cited in note 6); Charles Freeland, The Work of the Base Committee, in
Robert C. Effros, ed, 2 Current Legal Issues Affecting Cent Banks 231, 232 (May 1994).
35 See, for example, BIS, Press Release, Meeting of GIO central bank governors and heads of banking
supervision (Mar 10, 2003), available online at <http://www.bis.org/press/p03031 1a.htm> (visited
Nov 8, 2004).
36 See, for example, BIS, Press Release, The New Basel CapitalAccord (Apr 29, 2003), available online
at <http://www.bis.org/press/p030429.htm> (visited Nov 8, 2004). The Committee suggests
that "[c]omments... should be submitted to relevant national supervisory authorities and central
banks." Id. However, it also invites direct comments: "[C]omments may be sent to the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision at the Bank for International Settlements, CH-4002 Basel,
Switzerland. Comments may also be sent by e-mail: BCBS.Capital@bis.org or by fax: 41 61 280
9100 and should be directed to the attention of the Basel Committee Secretariat." Id. One recent
example of the sort of schedule that the committee has taken to issuing may be found in an
October 11, 2003 press release:
All members of the Committee agreed on the importance of finalising the
New Accord expeditiously and in a manner that is technically and prudentially
sound. Such an Accord should offer considerable benefits over the existing
system. Moreover, it is important in the near term to provide banks with as
much certainty as possible while they plan and prepare for the adoption of the
new rules. Committee members committed to work promptly to resolve the
outstanding issues by no later than mid-year 2004.
BIS, Press Release, Basel I: Significant Progress on Major Issues (Oct 11, 2003), available online at
<http://www.bis.org/press/p031011.htm> (visited Nov 8, 2004).
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For example, for its new capital adequacy accord, which I discuss in more
detail below, the committee has welcomed comments, which it has concluded
"will be helpful to the Committee as it makes the final modifications to its
proposal for a new capital adequacy framework."37 When issuing statements
about the progress of the accord, the Committee has also tended to issue a
timetable. For the capital accord, "[t]he goal of the Committee is
implementation to take effect in member countries by year-end 2006."38
The use of press releases to announce an organization's purpose and
activity is rather far removed from a conventional international legal treaty and
accompanying annals of drafting, and it illustrates how different the Basle
Committee is from a formally constituted international organization. It has
promulgated no bylaws, its founding instrument is sparse, and it has no facilities
of its own.39 The Economist has characterized it as nothing more than an
"international club for banking regulators. ' 40 The Committee does not even
have its own staff: its secretariat is comprised of twelve professional supervisors
on temporary secondment from member banks to the Bank for International
Settlements ("BIS")-a private bank mostly owned and operated by the central
banks of 31 countries, including the Federal Reserve41-in Basle.42 (The BIS was
begun after World War I "to promote the co-operation of central banks and to
provide additional facilities for international financial operations. 43)
Moreover, many of the Basle Committee's promulgations do not look very
lawlike. In striking comparison to the length of domestic banking regulations, its
37 BIS, The New Basel CapitalAccord (cited in note 36). See also BIS, Press Release, Update on the New
Basel Capital Accord (June 25, 2001), available online at <http://www.bis.org/press/
p010625.htm> (visited Nov 8, 2004) ("The Committee intends to continue promoting an open
dialogue as its work continues and believes that such efforts will help to ensure that the new
Accord meets its objectives.").
38 BIS, Press Release, The New Basel CapitalAccord, available online at <http://www.bis.org/press/
p030429.htm> (cited in note 36).
39 See Norton, Devising International Bank Supervisoy Standards at 177 (cited in note 30).
40 Getting Closer?, Economist 82 (May 25, 1996).
41 See BIS, The Bank for International Settlements: A Profile of an International OqganiZation 2 (June 1995).
See also BIS, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, available online at
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm> (cited in note 23). Interestingly, the predecessor to
the European Central Bank, deemed a major achievement of the European unification, was the
loosely organized Committee of Central Bank Governors, which met, as the Basle Committee
does now, under the auspices of the BIS in Basle, beginning in 1964. See Kathleen R. McNamara,
Where Do Rules Come From? The Creation of the European Central Bank, in Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne
Sandholtz, and Neil Fligstein, eds, The Institutionalization of Europe 155, 165-66 (Oxford 2001).
42 See <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm> (cited in note 23) (describing the twelve BIS
staffers who serve as the committee's secretariat).
43 Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements, art 3 (2003), available online at
<http://www.bis.org/about/statutes-en.pdf> (visited Nov 8, 2004).
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initial concordat was just ten pages long, and its first capital accord only twenty-
eight pages long.44 Promulgations such as its Principles of Banking Supervision
are worded unspecifically and flexibly.
45
The committee itself avows that it "does not possess any formal
supranational supervisory authority, and its conclusions do not, and were never
intended to, have legal force. 46 Instead, it "reports to the central bank
Governors of the Group of Ten countries and seeks the Governors'
endorsement for its major initiatives. 47
Moreover, in the Basle regime, monitoring noncompliance is a
decentralized, largely self-reported task. Neither the BIS nor any other
international organization takes on a monitoring role, although the Committee
has vowed in the past that it "intends to monitor and review the application of
... [its agreements] in the period ahead with a view to achieving ever greater
consistency" and now surveys its members on their progress with
implementation.48
Do, then, the members of the committee experience the agreements
reached as binding? The reports of some participants suggest that they do.
Former supervisor Charles Freeland claims that "[w]ithout in any way
approaching the legal status of a treaty, . . . [an] agreement is considered to be
binding on its members. '49 BIS supervisor Andrew Crockett similarly concludes
44 BIS, Information Flows between Banking Supenisoy Authoriies (Apr 1990), available online at
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc3l3.pdf> (visited Nov 8, 2004) (Basle Concordat); Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards (July 1988), available online at <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04A.pdf> (visited Nov
8, 2004) (original Basle Accord); John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Treasury, Basel II: A
Brave New World for Financial Institutions?, Address at the American Academy in Berlin (Dec 15,
2003), available online at <http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2003-99a.pdf> (visited Nov 8,
2004).
45 See note 179-80.
46 See BIS, The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm>
(cited in note 23).
47 Id.
48 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurements
and Capital Standards 6 (1997), reprinted in 1 Compendium of Documents Produced by the Basle
Committee on Banking Superision 58-82, at 6 (BIS 1997); Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, Working Papers: Supervisory risk assessment and early warning ystems (2000), available
online at <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs.wp4.htm> (visited Nov 8, 2004) (survey of new bank
monitoring systems used by regulators in the ten largest economies).
4 Freeland, 2 Current Legal Issues Affecting Cent Banks at 233 (cited in note 34). According to the
General Accounting Office ("GAO"), the Basle Committee itself has concluded that it "must
continue to rely on moral suasion rather than legal authority to encourage adoption of its
standards and monitor their implementation." See GAO, International Banking: Strengthening the
Framework at 34 (cited in note 32).
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that even though Basle Committee recommendations "have no legal force," they
have been "applied in all countries represented on the Committee" and "almost
universally applied in non-member countries. '0
For example, American banking regulators51 have generally treated the
Committee's theoretically voluntary proposals as the basis for rapid domestic
regulatory action. 52  The banking regulators have quickly adopted rules
implementing the Basle Committee's capital accord for American banks and
bank holding companies.5 3
In September 1996, US bank regulators issued a final rule based on the
Basle Committee's January 1996 amendment to the Basle Accord. That rule
required that banks use their own internal models to provide a measure of the
50 Andrew Crockett, General Manager, BIS, International standard setting infinancial supervision, Lecture
at the Cass Business School, City University, London (Feb 5, 2003), available online at
<http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp030205.htm> (visited Nov 8, 2004). Crockett concludes that
this is "a telling example of the power of peer pressure and market forces to promote the
adoption of best practice and to enforce what I have elsewhere called 'soft law'." John Braithwaite
and Peter Drahos theorize that this sort of regulatory interaction can result in "developed dialogic
webs" in which "praise and shame are institutionalized," which can create an impetus to
harmonization. John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation 555 (Cambridge
2000). Of course, the Committee itself has recognized that implementation depends on many
factors, and that there is a difference between having a regulation in place and having the
regulation effectively implemented. There are also difficulties inherent in some jurisdictions
having qualified staff to fully implement the Core Principles and having a framework setting limits
on concentration of lending and on connected lending. See GAO, International Finance: Actions
Taken to Reform Financial Sectors in Asian Emerging Markets: Report to Congressional Requesters (Sept
1999), available online at <http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99157.pdf> (visited Nov 8,
2004).
51 To enact Basle requirements domestically, the four agencies principally charged with banking
regulation-the Federal Reserve, the OCC, the FDIC, and the OTS-announce coauthored
rulemakings in the Federal Register. See text accompanying note 53.
52 Tarbert, 56 Bus Law at 792 (cited in note 33).
When the Basle Accord was assembled in 1988, members of the "club of
giants" likely had no idea that their capital adequacy standards would become
so far-reaching. This is especially remarkable for standards that were simply a
gentlemen's agreement among a small group of central bankers and never
ratified into international law. Even though the Basle countries "are not legally
bound, the Basle Accords' methodology now applies to virtually all financial
institutions worldwide."
Id, quoting Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking
Supervision, 39 VaJ Intl L 1, 6 (1998).
53 See SEC, OTC Derivatives Dealers, 63 Fed Reg 59362, 59384 (1998). The rules comprised
Federal Reserve System, Docket No. R-0884; Department of the Treasury, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Docket No. 96-18; and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
RIN 3064-AB64 (Sept 6, 1996). See Department of the Treasury, Federal Reserve System, and
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Rules and Regulations, 61 Fed Reg 47358 (1996). The
Basle standard was adopted by the Federal Reserve on March 15, 1989. See 12 CFR §5 208.1.127
& app A-B (1991); 12 CFR § 160-88 app A-B (1991).
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institutions' "value at risk," subject to regulatory modeling criteria.5 4 Here's how
domestic banking regulators characterize the impact of the Basle Committee
process:
In December 1995, the G-10 Governors endorsed the Basle Committee's
amendment to the Accord (effective by year-end 1997) to incorporate a
measure for exposure to market risk (market risk amendment) into the
capital adequacy assessment. On September 6, 1996, the [federal banking
supervision] agencies issued revisions to their risk-based capital standards
implementing the Basle Committee's market risk amendment (market risk
rules) .... In September 1997, the Basle Committee modified the market
risk amendment and on December 30, 1997, the agencies issued an interim
rule implementing that modification...s5
Thus, the American banking regulators themselves have described how
they have turned Basle pronouncements into hard regulations within a year of
the international agreement to do so. Nor are the implementation of
modifications to the capital adequacy accord unique. 56 Recently, the Federal
Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), and the other
domestic banking agencies with memberships on the committee acted in unison,
with a single unified rulemaking designed to offer quick domestic
implementation of the international rule.57
The widespread implementation of the capital adequacy accord has been
both acclaimed for its real impact and accused of the usual sorts of inefficiencies
laisse!?'jaire aficionados attribute to hard regulations. Andrew Crockett, General
Manager of the BIS and Chairman of the Financial Stability Forum, believes that
"the absence of significant difficulties in the banking systems of Europe and
America in the past couple of years, despite significant economic shocks, owes
much to the strengthening of risk management that has taken place under the
aegis of the Basle Committee's standards." 8
Others agree that the committee has affected banking supervision, but
argue that it has done so in insalubrious ways. Hal Scott has contended that the
54 GAO, Finandal Derivatives: Actions Taken or Proposed Since May 1994, 56 (Nov 1996), available online
at <http://www.gao.gov/archive/1 9 9 7/gl 97008.pdf> (visited Nov 8, 2004).
55 OCC, Federal Reserve, and FDIC, Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 64 Fed Reg 19034,
19035 (1999).
56 See, for example, Bank One Corporation v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 120 TC 174, 222-23 (2003)
(discussing "the OCC's acceptance of a 1986 recommendation of the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) that banks should build a cautious bias into their
estimates of the replacement costs of off-balance-sheet instruments").
57 Internal Ratings-Based Systems for Retail Credit Risk for Regulatory Capital, 69 Fed. Reg. 62748
(October 27, 2004) (couched as "supervisory guidance').
58 Andrew Crockett, Lecture at City University, London (cited in note 50).
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uniform rules of the Accord have been bad for competition.59 Jonathan Macey
similarly believes that the sort of regulatory globalization required by the Accord
has done little good to the financial markets. Instead, he argues that it is simply a
reflection of the inclinations of bureaucrats to maximize power.6°
B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES
COMMISSIONS ("IOSCO")
IOSCO is a regulatory organization that developed out of the
Interamerican Association of Securities Commissions and Similar Agencies in
1984, when the members of that body passed bylaws transforming it from a
regional group founded a decade earlier into a global collection of securities
regulators.61 IOSCO's members have agreed to "cooperate together to promote
high standards of regulation in order to maintain just, efficient and sound
markets; to exchange information on their respective experiences in order to
promote the development of domestic markets; to unite their efforts to establish
standards and an effective surveillance of international securities transactions; to
provide mutual assistance to promote the integrity of the markets by a rigorous
application of the standards and by effective enforcement against offenses. 62
59 Hal S. Scott, The Conpelitive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 39 SLU L J 885, 894 (1995)
(concluding of the Accord that "we should be less sanguine about competitive benefits of
international banking agreements given the fundamental differences that remain between
countries').
60 Macey accordingly believes that:
efforts to achieve regulatory globalization occur in the following three
contexts: (1) in order to permit regulators to act in a cartel-like fashion, so as
to prevent regulatory arbitrage, which occurs when firms migrate to foreign
jurisdictions to avoid the grasp of a domestic regulator ("regulatory
cartelization"); (2) in circumstances where governmental actors or regulators
can increase their power by persuading or forcing other countries to adopt
regulations favored by the first country ("regulatory imperialism"); and (3) in
circumstances where an administrative agency lacks domestic political support
for a favored policy, and uses regulatory globalization to make it more difficult
for local political rivals to block that policy ("regulatory policy lever").
52 Emory LJ at 1353-54 (cited in note 13).
61 See Paul Guy, Regulatoy Harmonialion to Achieve Effective International Competition, in Franklin R.
Edwards and Hugh T. Patrick, eds, Reguelating International Financial Markets: Issues and Polities 291,
291 (Kluwer 1992). The bylaws of IOSCO declare that "[t]he securities commissions or similar
agencies of the countries of the American Continent, as well as the Commission des valeurs
mobilieres du Quebec and the Ontario Securities Commission, are charter members of the
Organization." Bylaws of the International Organization of Securities Commissions pt 2, 2.
62 IOSCO, 2002 Annual Report 22 (2002), available online at <http://dev.iosco.org/annual-report/
PDF/IOSCO2002.pdf> (visited Nov 7, 2004).
Winter 2005
Zaring
Chicago Journal of International Law
IOSCO is a much less selective organization than the Basle Committee-it
claims 174 members, overseeing almost all of the world's capital markets.63
However, in other matters of form, the two organizations are very similar. As
with the Basle Committee, IOSCO combines informal structure, an absence of
claims that its pronouncements rise to the level of law, and internal opacity. As
The Economist has done with the Basle Committee, the Financial Times has
characterized 1OSCO as the "international securities regulators club.,
64
Still, few international organizations, including even the Basle Committee,
can claim origins as humble and informal as those of IOSCO, which was
incorporated by a private bill of the Quebec National Assembly.65 It has since
created and funded a small permanent secretariat, which in 2001 moved from
Montreal to Madrid.66 The organization does not limit membership to
prosperous countries, or even government agencies, the way the Basle
Committee does. Among its many affiliate members are private securities
regulators such as the London Stock Exchange, the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, and the International Securities Market Association, an organization
that "exceeds 600 financial entities," including investment banks and securities
brokers.67
63 See the IOSCO membership lists available online at <http://www.iosco.org/
lists/display-members.cfm?memid=1> (visited Nov 9, 2004); <http://www.iosco.org/lists
/display-members.cfm?memlD=3&orderBy=Jurisdiction> (visited Nov 9, 2004);
<http://www.iosco.org/lists/display-members.cfm?memlD=2&orderBy=Jurisdiction> (visited
Nov 9, 2004).
64 Getting Closer?, Economist at 82 (cited in note 40); Listing to Port, Fin Times 13 (May 28, 1998). See
also Tarbert, 56 Bus Law at 782 (cited in note 33), citing Christos D. Hadjiemmanuil, Central
Bankers' "Club" Law and Transitional Economies: Banking Reform and the Reception of the Basle Standards of
Prudential Supervision in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, in Joseph J. Norton and Mads
Andenas, eds, Emerging Financial Markets and the Role of International Financial Organizations 184
(Kiuwer 1996) ("[S]ome commentators have glibly referred to this new genre of legal species as
'club' law.").
65 See Guy, Regulatory HarmoniZation at 291 (cited in note 61); IOSCO, 1999 Annual Report, Notes to
Financial Statements, available online at <http://www.iosco.org/annual.report/Archive_1999/
append2/24.htm> (visited Oct 31, 2004) (IOSCO was "incorporated under a private act (L.Q.
1987, Chapter 143) sanctioned by the Quebec National Assembly'). See also IOSCO, 2002
Annual Report at 33 (cited in note 62).
66 See IOSCO, 2002 Annual Report at 33 (cited in note 62) (stating that "[dluring 2001 the
organization changed its domicile to Madrid"); Kathryn M. Trkla, Financial Stability: Major Focus of
IOSCO Conference, Future Indus Mag June/July 1999), available online at
<http://www.futuresindustry.org/fnagazi-1929.asp?a=576> (visited Sept 19, 2004) (stating that
the IOSCO Presidents' Committee approved relocation of the IOSCO General Secretariat from
Montreal to Madrid).
67 See <http://www.iosco.org/lists/display-members.cfm?memid=l> (cited in note 63) (listing
members, 105 of which are ordinary members (that is, the principal securities regulators of a
particular jurisdiction, such as the SEC), 9 are associate members, including other government
regulators such as the CFTC, and 60 are affiliate members, such as the NYSE). For the
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This membership is organized in a somewhat complicated-but
nonetheless unconstrained-way, with broad grants of authority more typical of
corporate bylaws than the complex treaties governing international
organizations. IOSCO's Presidents' Committee, for example, which is
comprised of the presidents of the member agencies (but not the private
nongovernment members), meets annually and "has all the powers necessary or
convenient to achieve the purpose of the Organization."68 Its nineteen-member
Executive Committee oversees IOSCO's operations, and "subject to the By-
Laws of the Organization, takes all decisions and undertakes all actions
necessary or convenient to achieve the objectives of the Organization. '69
IOSCO's General Secretariat coordinates the organization's activities, and
responds to requests for information and assistance from members and from the
organization's committees.7 ° The Secretariat consists of ten employees. 71 The
organization is financed by membership dues of $6,750 per member per year.72
In 2001, IOSCO's revenues amounted to $2,670,051-approximately 40 percent
of which was a subsidy from the Government of Spain "to cover expenses
incurred to relocate its General Secretariat from Montreal (Canada) to Madrid
(Spain)., 73 By contrast, the World Trade Organization's 2004 budget was
162 million Swiss francs (approximately $107 million),74 the United Nation's
annual budget is approximately $1.3 billion, 75 and the SEC's annual budget for
fiscal 2004 has been proposed at $841.5 million.76
membership of the International Securities Markets Association, see ISMA, About ISMA,
available online at <http://www.isma.org/aboutl.html> (visited Nov 9, 2004).
68 IOSCO, 2002 Annual Report at 22 (cited in note 62).
69 Id. See also Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., It's a Small World after All: The SEC's Role in Securiies Regulation
Globalization, 51 Admin L Rev 1105, 1107-08 (1999) (giving former SEC Commissioner Isaac
Hunt's perspective on the organization of IOSCO, and the place of the executive committee).
The Executive Committee is composed of nineteen members: the chairs of the organization's
Technical and Emerging Markets Committees, the chairs of its four Regional Committee, one
ordinary member elected by each Regional Committee from among the ordinary members of that
region, and ordinary members elected by the Presidents' Committee. See id.
70 IOSCO, 2002 Annual Report at 14-16 (cited in note 62).
71 IOSCO's website lists ten people on its list of contacts. See <http://www.iosco.org/about/>
(visited Nov 9, 2004).
72 IOSCO, 2002 Annual Report at 26 (cited in note 62).
73 Id at 30, 34.
74 See The World Trade Organization, Information about the Instituion, available online at
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/thewtoe.htm> (visited Nov 9, 2004).
75 See World Federation of United Nations Associations, UN Facts, available online at
<http://www.wfuna.org/link/toolkits/unfacts.cfm> (visited Oct 31, 2004) ("The regular budget
of the UN is some $1.3 billion per year."); Kitchen Diplomag, 140 Foreign Poly 18 (Jan 2004)
(discussing "U.N.'s annual budget of $1.25 billion"); US Mission to the United Nations, Fact
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Like the Basle Committee, IOSCO now provides a lot of material on its
website. In 2002, for example, it issued fifteen "public documents," including
reports on "sound practices" and statements of "principles of supervision. ' 77 It
also issues an annual report, sells records of some of the sessions of its annual
conference, and catalogs press releases, memoranda of understanding, and
IOSCO resolutions in its online library.8
Most of these principles were developed in IOSCO's Technical
Committee, which is where the sort of regulatory action most comparable to
that of the Basle Committee may be found.7 9 Like the Basle Committee, the
Technical Committee is limited in membership to the world's most advanced
financial regulators (IOSCO's Technical Committee has sixteen members, while
the Basle Committee is limited to regulators from twelve countries).8" The
Technical Committee, which was established by IOSCO in 1987 and then
reorganized at the behest of the SEC in the early 1990s, receives the lion's share
of the agency's attention in the world's financial press. The Toronto Globe and Mail
has characterized the Technical Committee as "the central policy-making group
at" IOSCO.8" It is the source of IOSCO promulgations that have required the
SEC and Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") to engage
domestic rulemaking.82
Although many of IOSCO's promulgations remain undisclosed, like those
of the Basle Committee, the organization's output has increasingly become
available for public scrutiny. The presidents still operate secretly at IOSCO
Sheet, The United Nations-Myth and Reality: UN Budget and Bureaucray, available online at
<http://www.un.int/usa/fact3.htm> (visited Oct 31, 2004).
76 House Approves Measure to Speed Staffing of SEC, Wall St J C5 (Jun 18, 2003) (The amount would be
nearly double its fiscal 2002 level.).
77 See IOSCO, Public Documents, available online at <http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?
whereami=pubdocs&year=2002> (visited Nov 9, 2004).
78 See IOSCO, Libragy of Public Documents, available online at <http://www.iosco.org/
library/index.cfm?whereami=library> (visited Nov 9, 2004). As of this writing, the organization
lists approximately 21 resolutions and 175 other public documents in its online library. Id.
79 A.A. Somer, for example, interviewed a number of leading officials in the SEC, and concluded
that "[t]he committee which might be said to do the 'grunt work' with respect to the most
developed markets is the Technical Committee." A.A. Somer, losco: Its Mission andAchievement, 17
NwJ Int L & Bus 15,18 (1995).
80 IOSCO, 2002 Annual Report at 7 (cited in note 62).
81 Richard Blackwell, OSC Head to Lead International Group, Toronto Globe & Mail B3 (Mar 23,
2002). See also Nancy Worth, Harmonihng CapitalAdequay Rules for International Banks and Securities
Firms, 18 NC J Intl L & Comm Reg 133, 134 n 1 (1992), citing IOSCO, Annual Reports from
1989-91; Karen Cooper, World Watchdog for Securities, Sydney Morning Herald 38 (Aug 8, 1987)
(describing initial founding of the Technical Committee); Somer, 17 Nw J Ind L at 19 (cited in
note 79) (describing the role of the SEC and Richard Breeden, then its chairman).
82 See notes 91-110 and accompanying text.
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meetings-under its bylaws, "[o]bservers and special guests may not attend
meetings of the Presidents Committee unless invited by the Chairman with the
concurrence of a majority of the members."83 Now, however, 1OSCO
"recognizes the importance of maintaining a close dialogue with" the self-
regulatory organizations and interest groups "that make up its affiliate
membership and of allowing them to make a constructive input in the work of
the Organization.,
84
Like the Basle Committee, IOSCO's administrative procedures are ad hoc
and flexible. It creates informal agreements on financial regulation and tells its
members to go home and implement them.85 It holds comment periods, but is
not subject to open-meeting laws,86 judicial review, or any other criteria such as
those found in the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). For comment, it
appears to rely on the participation of its affiliate membership. IOSCO has not
announced ways for nonparticipants to make comments in the way that the
Basle Committee has.87
However, like the Basle Committee, IOSCO also aspires to achieve its
goals of regulatory harmonization through consensus. 88 In the words of the
SEC, "IOSCO is an organization that operates on the basis of consensus, rather
than majority votes. Its resolutions are non-binding on its member
organizations."89 However, unlike the Basle Committee, and perhaps in order to
achieve that consensus, IOSCO defines harmonization broadly. German Stock
Exchange Federation Executive Vice President Ruediger von Rosen emphasized
at one IOSCO meeting that, whatever the merits of harmonization, "value
should be attached to the possibility of giving issuers and investors a choice
between quite different rules and regulations."9 Thus, when 1OSCO passes a
83 IOSCO, Bylaws at pt 4, 1 23 (cited in note 61).
84 IOSCO, 2002 Annual Report at 24 (cited in note 62). To this end, "the SRO Consultative
Committee has designated contact persons with the Technical Committee Standing Committees
and Project Teams and is therefore able to provide substantive input related to their regulatory
initiatives." Id.
85 Even American regulators say that they benefit from the best practices style exploration of
options that characterize some of the recommendations of the international organization.
Interview with a Staff Attorney, CFTC (Jan 23, 2004).
86 Indeed, IOSCO holds its meetings in secret. See Somer, 17 Nw J Intl L & Bus at 19 (cited in note
79) (observing that "all committee meetings of IOSCO are closed").
87 See note 36.
88 See Guy, Regulatory Harmonizaion at 296 (cited in note 61).
89 SEC, Report on Promoting Global Preeminence of American Securities Markets pursuant to Section 509(5) of
the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 g 5A (Oct 1997), available online at
<http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/acctgsp.htm#sec5> (visited Sept 19, 2004).
90 See "Convergence," More than Harmonization, Is Key Word in Cautious Working Group Sessions, 2 Intl Sec
Reg Rep No 20, at 8 (Sept 27, 1989). IOSCO has gingerly pursued regulatory cooperation in the
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resolution, the SEC has announced that "each IOSCO member would have to
determine whether and how to consider adoption of these standards at a
domestic level."'" IOSCO's general principles argue that "[t]here is often no
single correct approach to a regulatory issue.' 92
So what about standardization in America? Both the SEC and the CFTC
have played a role in the organization's membership since its inception, and both
have clearly acted pursuant to those IOSCO resolutions that have required
compliance from them. For example, the recent revisions to the SEC's treatment
of auditor independence were occasioned by the passage of domestic
legislation-the Sarbanes-Oxley Act-but also, as the agency acknowledged,
"with the Principles of Auditor Independence and the Role of Corporate
Governance in Monitoring an Auditor's Independence issued by... IOSCO...
in October 2002 in mind. 93
The SEC has "fundamentally conformed the non-financial statement
disclosure requirements for foreign private issuers to the non-financial statement
disclosure requirements adopted by ... [IOSCO]." 94 It has also referred foreign
investors considering investments in American stocks to IOSCO for
information about the process9" and has praised the organization for "mov[ing]
regulators around the globe to work more closely together." 96
context of national differences since its inception. In 1988, it resolved that "despite the national
differences, which are narrowing, cooperation among the countries should be encouraged by
IOSCO." Regulators Agree to Move Cautiousy on Enforcement, Information Exchanges, 20 Sec Reg & L
Rep 1861, 1862 July-Dec 1988). Why tolerate such differences? Traditionally, observers have
pointed to a distinction between public shareholder (in other words, the US and the UK) and
creditor (in other words, Germany and France) perspectives, in determining how to handle
accounting questions. Andrew Crockett, Towards Global Financial Reporting Standards: A Critical Pillar
in the International FinancialArebitecture, Address at the US-Europe Symposium 2002 (Feb 27, 2002),
available online at <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp020227.htm> (visited Sept 19, 2004).
91 SEC, Report on Promoting Global Preeminence ofAmerican Securities § 5A (cited in note 89). Guy also
argues that "[h]armonization does not necessarily mean that regulations must be identical." Guy,
Regulatoy Harmonization at 297 (cited in note 61). Guillermo Harteneck, the president of
Argentina's security commission, similarly told IOSCO that the implementation of harmonizing
agreements "may change from country to country." Harmonization Key for World Capital Markets,
Officials at IOSCO Declare, 63 BNA Banking Rep No 15, at 609 (Oct 1994).
92 IOSCO, Objectives and Princples of Security Regulation 2 (Sept 1998), available online at
<http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCPD82-English.pdf> (visited Sept 19, 2004).
93 SEC, Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 67 Fed
Reg 76780, 76780 n 7 (2002).
94 SEC, Disclosure in Managment's Discussion and Analysis About the Application of Critical
Accounting Policies, 67 Fed Reg 35620, 35637 (2002).
95 SEC, Press Release, The Fleecing of Foreign Investors: Avoid Getting Burned by "Hot" U.S. Stocks (Mar
2001), available online at <http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/fleecing.htm> (visited Sept 19,
2004) ("Are the Broker and the Firm Licensed? Contact your securities regulator to find out. The
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Perhaps most tangibly, the SEC has adopted the International Disclosure
Standards developed by IOSCO for nonfinancial statement information." As
one SEC official has put it, the standards "represent an international consensus
on the type of disclosure that should be provided when foreign issuers make a
public offering of equity securities or list their equity securities on a foreign
exchange."98 IOSCO issued these standards in 1998; in 1999, the SEC
promulgated changes to its Form 20-F, the "lynchpin of its foreign integrated
disclosure system, to fully incorporate the Standards."99
Finally, the SEC conducts self-assessments to monitor its compliance with
IOSCO's concise and broadly defined Core Principles, as well as with specific
initiatives such as the International Disclosure Standards.'00
The SEC's stated support of IOSCO has a lengthy pedigree. In 1988, the
SEC issued a policy statement noting that "all securities regulators should work
together diligently to create sound international regulatory frameworks that will
International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO) provides contact information
for most securities regulators on its website.").
96 Annette L. Nazareth, Address at the Practicing Law Institute Conference on International
Securities Markets (May 9, 2003), available online at <http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch050903aln.htm> (visited Sept 19, 2004) ("Our active participation in the work of IOSCO in
the areas of credit rating agencies and analyst conflicts of interest is evidence of the fact that
events here in the U.S. have moved regulators around the globe to work more closely together.").
97 SEC, Rulings, International Disclosure Standards, Fed Secs L Rep (CCH) 86208, at 82365 (Sept
28, 1999); SEC, International Accounting Standards, 65 Fed Reg 8896, 8897 (2000); IOSCO,
International Disclosure Standards For Crvss-Border Offerings And Initial listings By Foreign Issuers (Sept
1998), available online at <http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD81.pdf> (visited Sept
19, 2004). Recently, the SEC has admitted that its "decision to adopt the International Disclosure
Standards was based on our conclusion that the standards were of high quality and that their
adoption would provide information comparable to the amount and quality of information that
U.S. investors receive today." SEC, International Accounting Standards at 8897.
98 Felicia H. Kung, The Rationalization of Regulatory Internationalization, 33 L & Poly in Ind Bus 443, 467
(2002). IOSCO's standards "cover the gamut of expected disclosure topics, including description
of an issuer's business, operating and financial review and prospects, compensation paid to an
issuer's directors and officers, and the identification of major shareholders and related party
transactions." Id. I interviewed an SEC official, who characterized the standards as an important
tangible change in the way the SEC conducts its regulatory business. Interview with a Staff
Attorney, SEC (Jan 22, 2004).
99 Kung, 33 L & Poly in Intl Bus at 468 (cited in note 98); IOSCO, International Disclosure Standards at
82365 (cited in note 97). For a very detailed example of the congruence between American law
and IOSCO principles for funds regulation, see Robert W. Helm, Creating Managing and
Distbuting Offshore Investment Products: A Legal Perpective, 1360 PLI/Corp 243, 292-98 (concluding
that there is almost identical congruence in many, but not all, fields).
100 SEC, 2002 Annual Report 20 (2002), available online at <http://www.sec.gov/pdf/
annrep02/ar02full.pdf> (visited Sept 19, 2004); IOSC, Technical Committee, Report On
Implementation Of International Disclosure Standards 1 (May 2000), available online at
<http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfmwvhereami=orderdocs&doclD=IOSCOPD106>
(visited Sept 19, 2004). I discuss the Core Principles in greater detail later in this article.
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enhance the vitality of capital markets."'0 ' To be sure, the agency does not
change its standards to reflect every particular IOSCO standard-Beth Simmons
is particularly skeptical of the closeness of the relationship between the
international organization and the agency° 2-- but it deems itself to be in
compliance with the IFRO's Core Principles and to have harmonized its
international disclosure requirements with those of IOSCO.
The CFTC has also cited IOSCO as the authority and basis for agency
action. The futures regulator, an associate member of IOSCO and, like the SEC,
subject to APA review of its rulemakings, has also cited IOSCO's
pronouncements as bases for its promulgations.0 3 The CFTC has "amended our
nonfinancial statement disclosure requirements for offerings by foreign issuers
to conform to the international disclosure standards adopted by IOSCO in
1998,', 104 and it has cited guidelines issued by IOSCO as "appropriate" ones for
automated clearing systems,0 5 screen-based trading systems, 06 and electronic
trading systems. 7 One CFTC employee has told me that the agency does most
of its cooperative regulatory work with foreign regulators through IOSCO.'0°
101 SEC, 65 Fed Reg at 8897 (cited in note 97), citing SEC, Regulation of International Securities
Markets, Securities Act Release No 6807, 53 Fed Reg 4693 (1988).
102 See Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of CapitalMarket Regulation,
55 Ind Org 589, 595 (2001) ("The size of the internal U.S. market gives U.S. regulators an
incentive to make unilateral regulatory decisions, even if foreign regulators do not follow suit.").
103 See text accompanying notes 104-09.
104 CFTC, A New Regulatory Framework for Clearing Organizations, 65 Fed Reg 76008, 76029
(2001), citing SEC, International Disclosure Standards, 64 Fed Reg 53,900 (1999).
105 CFTC, A New Regulatory Framework for Clearing Organizations, 66 Fed Reg 45604, 45613
(2001) ("The Commission believes that the guidelines issued by the IOSCO in 1990 and adopted
by the Commission on November 21, 1990 (55 Fed. Reg. 48670), as supplemented in October
2000, are appropriate guidelines for an automated clearing system to apply.").
106 CFTC, A New Regulatory Framework for Trading Facilities, Intermediaries and Clearing
Organizations, 66 Fed Reg 42256, 42275 (2001) ("The Commission believes that the guidelines
issued by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in 1990 (which
have been referred to as the "Principles for Screen-Based Trading Systems'), and adopted by the
Commission on November 21, 1990 (55 Fed. Reg. 48670), as supplemented in October 2000, are
appropriate guidelines for an electronic trading facility to apply to electronic trading systems.').
107 CFTC, Petition of the Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and the New
York Mercantile Exchange for Exemption pursuant to Section 4(c) of the Commodity Exchange
Act, 64 Fed Reg 46356, 46358-59 (1999) ("The Commission notes that its review of newly
created electronic trading systems has been, and continues to be, based on principles developed
by the international regulatory community-specifically the International Organization of
Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"). Should the Commission's review of electronic trading
systems be based on standards other than or different from those contained in the IOSCO
principles?").
108 Interview with a Staff Attorney, CFTC (cited in note 85). However, cooperative enforcement
work also involves the regulators who have signed on to the so-called "Boca Declaration," which
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The CFTC has also used IOSCO standards in specific rule applications, as
well as in rulemaking. For example, in evaluating whether a Norwegian
clearinghouse could operate on the International Maritime exchange, the agency
"evaluated the oversight activities undertaken by [the clearinghouse's Norwegian
regulator] in the context of the Principles and Objectives of Securities
Regulation issued by [IOSCO]."'' 9 The CFTC accordingly did "not ma[ke] any
independent investigation or assessment of the Norwegian regulatory
program."110
C. A MODEL OF REGULATORY COOPERATION
We can now identify some common features of the Basle Committee and
IOSCO, features that are shared by the successor organizations of both.
Membership of Regulators. The organizations are comprised of regulators,
not states. The SEC, the CFTC, and the stock exchanges are members of
IOSCO. The United States is not-and the Federal Reserve, OCC, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (along with the Office of Thrift Supervision and
the Federal Reserve's New York branch), not the State Department, represent
this country in the Basle Committee. The American officials who attend these
meetings are not diplomats and have not been trained as Foreign Service
officers; instead, they are banking supervisors who began their careers working
on ordinary matters of domestic supervision."'
Informally Constituted. IFROs are not created by treaties made between
countries duly signed and ratified. Their founding documents would not be
recognized by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties," 2 because in
was coordinated by the CFTC in 1997. Id. See CFTC, Declaration on Cooperation and Supervision of
International Futures Markets and Clearing Organizations (March 1998 Boca Declaration), available online
at <http://www.cftc.gov/oia/oiabocadec0398.htm> (visited Nov 9, 2004). For a description of
its intent, see IOSCO, International Conference on Financing for Development, Causes, Effects and
Regulatoy Implications of Financial and Economic Turbulence in Emerging Markets n 71, available online at
<http://esa.un.org/ffd/policydb/PolicyTexts/IOSCO-l.htm> (visited Oct 31, 2004) (stating
that "the Declaration on Co-operation and Supervision of International Futures Exchanges Clearing
Organizations, jointly signed by 55 derivatives exchanges and clearing houses signed in Boca Raton,
Florida in March 1996, defines specific events that will trigger a request for information from
another exchange or clearing house. These events include a large decrease in a member's capital
position, large cash flows in proprietary or customer accounts, or a concentration of positions in
any futures or options contract.").
109 CFTC, Recognition of Multilateral Cleating Organizations, 67 Fed Reg 2419, 2420 (2002).
110 Id.
111 Interview with a Staff Attorney, Federal Reserve Board (Jan 9, 2004).
112 See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 333 (1969) ("The
present Convention applies to treaties between States").
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international law all treaties apply only to states.' 1 3 Moreover, the documents that
do create the IFROs-and any governing bylaws or rules constraining the
organization-tend to be broad and flexible, not specific, detailed, and
constraining, as are many treaties that create traditional international
organizations (the United Nations is an example here)."' It is thus quite clear
that IFROs do not meet the standards of classic international law as
international organizations subject to its strictures. To list just two divergences,
the Restatement on US Foreign Relations Law suggests that an international
organization "is created by an international agreement and has a membership
consisting entirely or principally of states""' 5 and that "statehood ... is generally
a minimum qualification for membership in international organizations."'" 6 But
bureaucrats from the SEC, the CFTC, and the Federal Reserve attend IFRO
meetings as representatives of their agencies rather than their nation." 7 To the
Restatement, the term "organization" in international organization is to be given
a restrictive reading-international organizations generally have a headquarters,
staff, and budget to truly qualify as international subjects." 8 IFROs barely
possess these attributes." 9 Instead, as Sol Picciotto has observed, "they are
informal in nature: even where they are publicly visible, they are often not
113 See, for example, Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Droit International Public 618 (Librairie G~nrale de Droit et
de Jurisprudence 1994). Eleanor Kinney calls these networks "networks of national regulators...
that evolve outside any formal framework" which "are generally comprised of domestic regulators
that meet without treaty or executive authorization." Eleanor Kinney, The Emerging Field of
InternationalAdministrative Law: Its Content and Potential, 54 Admin L Rev 415, 426 (2002). She cites
the Basle Committee as a principle example of these networks. Id.
114 The UN's rules and regulations are vast, and possibly unwieldy. See, for example, A. Peter
Mutharika, The Role of the United Naions Security Coundl in Afican Peace Management: Some Proposals,
17 Mich J Ind L 537, 554 (1996) ("The United Nations as presently structured is unwieldy,
bureaucratic, and too expensive."); Frederic Kirgis, Book Review, 83 Am J Intl L 674, 675 (1989),
reviewing C.F. Amerasinghe's two-volume treatise on international civil service rules, The Law of
Internalional Civil Service (Oxford 1988) ("Amerasinghe's two volumes are not for everyone
interested in international law. They should be invaluable, though, to the researcher or
practitioner concerned with the specialized field of international (or even national) civil service
law.').
115 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations Law of the United States 5 221
(ALI 1987). Non-Americans also insist that traditionally defined international organizations be
created by states. See Henry G. Schermers, International Institutional Law 6-7 (A.W. Sijthoff 1972)
(positing that "[t]he founding agreement must be an agreement between States").
116 Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations Law § 222 comment A (cited in note 115).
117 See text accompanying note 111; Zaring, 33 Tex Int L J at n 203 (cited in note 6).
118 See Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations Law § 221, comment B (cited in note 115).
19 See text accompanying notes 28-50 and 62-92.
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founded on conventional legal instruments, such as treaties, but rather on
'gentlemen's agreements,' which may be semi-secret.' 120
Lighty Insitulionaied. IFROs have little permanent presence. Their
secretariats, if they exist at all, are very small. They have few, if any, employees.
Their annual budgets are minute. And other than regular meeting schedules,
there is little permanent presence to the entities. The Basle Committee does not
have its own secretariat: It relies on another international organization, the Bank
for International Settlements, in Basle, to meet this need, which itself relies for
governance on twelve banking supervisors from member countries on
temporary secondment.' The IOSCO Secretariat in Madrid administers an
annual budget dwarfed by that of the UN and one percent the size of the
WTOus.
12 2
Ui'ttle Substantive Equaliy. Although gauging influence within a quietly run
institution is difficult, this informality of organization means that it is possible
for important financial regulators to play a particularly influential role in the
organizations. Thus, in IOSCO, the SEC has traditionally been thought to be a
particularly important player, although the organization now operates in a
European milieu, 12 3 while in the Basle Committee, the Federal Reserve Bank and
the Bank of England have been thought driving forces. 124 American regulators
are thought to play a similar role in the Financial Action Task Force, another
second-generation IFRO, which, in the view of Beth Simmons, would not exist
absent heavy American interest in money laundering.'25
Secret Dedsionmaking, But Open to Input. IFROs generally operate through
closed meetings, and it is, therefore, difficult to discern how they deliberate and
agree on common supervisory standards. However, one recent development in
the administrative process of the Basle Committee and 1OSCO is that both
organizations now make an effort to invite comment from interested parties on
their most significant regulatory efforts.
IOSCO has done so in part through its large class of affiliate members,
which includes some representatives of private market participants, and through
comment periods. Moreover, the organization has created an easily accessible
120 Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of Neo-
Liberalism, 17 NwJ Intl L & Bus 1014, 1047 (1997).
121 Zaring, 33 Tex Intl LJ at 287-88 (cited in note 6).
122 See text accompanying notes 73-76.
123 See text accompanying notes 164-86.
124 See, for example, Picciotto, 17 Nw J Intl L & Bus at 1040 (cited in note 120); Porter, States,
Markets, and Regimes at 122-23 (cited in note 28); Gary N. Klieman, Better Forum Needed to Negotiate
Terms of Foreign Competition, Am Banker 5 (Jan 4, 1995).
125 Simmons, 55 Intl Org at 595 (cited in note 102).
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public library, which contains releases about what happened in the private
meetings of the organization and its committees, any resolutions made by the
IFRO, a variety of white papers, and annual reports. All of these documents are
available on the Internet.'26
The Basle Committee has similarly invited a number of rounds of
comments on its proposed revisions to its capital accord, and it also makes a
substantial number of documents available in its public library, many of which,
again, are available online. 1
27
The second wave of IFROs-those successor organizations to the Basle
Committee and IOSCO that I discuss herein-also have Internet presences and
a commitment to make a variety of documents, including, in most cases, any
founding or governing documents, available to nonmembers.
Proseyltizers. One reason for this commitment to public availability lies in
the proselytizing roles these organizations play. In attempting to spread best
practices to fellow regulators, and, particularly, to nonmembers, IFROs have
generated a blizzard of materials, frequently beginning with a set of core
standards to which all members must commit.128
III. THREE PRODUCTS OF THE NEW PROCEDURE
In this section, I divide the accomplishments of IOSCO and the Basle
Committee into three categories: hard achievements creating standardization
among sophisticated regulatory jurisdictions, soft agreements on common
principles and occasional recommended approaches to financial regulation (best
understood as the development of standards for developing jurisdictions), and
finally, the feat of modeling-by which I mean that the Basle Committee and
IOSCO serve as the progenitors of, and fora for, an increasingly complex web
of financial regulatory cooperation. I examine case studies of each of the three
accomplishments, and then I place them in analytical context.
A. HARD RULES AND THE TURN TO FORMAL PROCESS
One aspect of the evolution of the organizations has been, surprisingly, an
increased formality to the procedures employed by the organizations for those
126 See IOSCO, Libragy of Public Documents, available online at <http://www/iosco.org/library/>
(visited Oct 31, 2004).
127 For comments received by the Committee, see, for example, BIS, The Basle CapitalAccord:
Comments received on the Third Consultative Paper (Aug 20, 2003), available online at
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3comments.htm> (visited Oct 31, 2004). For the BIS library, see
BIS, Basel Committee Publications, available online at <http://www/bis.org/bcbs/publ.htm>
(visited Oct 31, 2004).
128 See text accompanying notes 177-86 for a discussion of the implications of this proselytization.
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actions that threaten to impact regulated industry .the most. The Basle
Committee is an example.
1. A Case Study
The Basle Committee's most tangible achievement thus far has been the
1988 Capital Accord. That informal agreement-running "little more than two
dozen pages and . . . adopted within seven months after the Committee's first
(and only) consultative paper was published for comment," as one American
regulator has observedli 9-provided for the implementation of a credit risk
measurement framework for all banks. The framework provided for a minimum
capital standard of 8 percent of risk-weighted assets (riskiness was assessed in
four "buckets," under which bank loans to the private sector had to be covered
by the most capital and loans to OECD governments, which were deemed to be
safer, by the least). 3° The capital adequacy standards promulgated in the 1988
Accord were fully implemented by all the committee member countries by
1992-to notable effect on the banks in those countries.13' The implementation
of the accord required American banks to add $10 billion to $15 billion to their
capital reserves, French banks, $13 billion, and Japanese banks, $26 billion to
$50 billion. 132 In fact, some observers have concluded that the implementation
of the 1988 Basle Accord forced Japanese banks to raise so much cash that the
129 See Hawke, Address at the American Academy in Berlin (cited in note 44).
130 Stronger Foundations, Economist (Jan 20, 2001) ("Basle required banks to hold capital equal to at
least 8% of their risk-weighted loans to the non-bank private sector. Government debt from
OECD countries required no capital, because these supposedly bore no credit risk. Non-OECD
sovereign debt had some capital requirements, but fewer than for any private-sector loans. Loans
between banks also entailed modest capital requirements."). See also OCC, Report to the
Congress Regarding the Differences in Capital and Accounting Standards Among the Federal
Banking and Thrift Agencies, 62 Fed Reg 26355-56 (May 13, 1997) ("The risk-based capital
guidelines establish a framework for imposing capital requirements generally based on credit risk.
Under the risk-based capital guidelines, balance sheet assets and off-balance sheet items are
categorized, or 'risk-weighted,' according to the relative degree of credit risk inherent in the asset
or off-balance sheet item. The risk-based capital guidelines specify four risk-weight categories--
zero percent, 20 percent, 50 percent, and 100 percent. Assets or off-balance sheet items with the
lowest levels of credit risk are risk-weighted in the lowest risk weight category; those presenting
greater levels of credit risk receive a higher risk weight. Thus, for example, securities issued by the
US government are risk-weighted at zero percent; one- to four-family home mortgages are risk-
weighted at 50 percent; unsecured commercial loans are risk-weighted at 100 percent."); Barbara
C. Matthews, Capital Adequay, Netting, and Derivatives, 2 Stan J L, Bus & Fin 167, 170 (1995)
(describing how the accord works).
131 See GAO, International Banking: Strengthening the Framework for Supervising International Banks at 4
(cited in note 32).
132 See Zaring, 33 Tex Intl L J at 283, citing Peter Norman, Capital Ratio Is Set by Banks of 12 Nations,
Wall St J 3, 7 (July 12, 1988) (cited in note 6). But see John D. Wagster, Impact of the 1988 Basle
Accord on International Banks, 51 J Fin 1321 (1996) (arguing that the Basle Committee failed to
increase the pricing advantage of Japanese banks).
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country's domestic markets were flooded with assets that depressed prices and
the value of collateral, thereby forcing more sales and creating a "vicious circle"
that contributed to that country's recession of the 1990s.'33
Moreover, the committee's work on the capital accord has been challenged
as an example of agencies on the loose.14 Tony Porter has concluded that US
banking regulators have used the Basle Committee to justify the imposition of
standards on US banks, even when those banks opposed implementation of the
standards.'35 As a former chair of the Basle Committee has noted, in the
preliminary agreements to the capital adequacy accord "[lt]he U.S. authorities
were anxious to move forward their proposals in the face of opposition on a
number of points from their banks. 136 Indeed, in Porter's view "[t]he 1988
accord was also used by the US as a basis to impose standards on firms that the
accord itself had exempted because they were not primarily international.' 137
For example, the Basle Committee released its final version of the 1988
Capital Accord on July 15, 1988.138 At that point, all the members of the
Committee, including the US banking regulators, had committed themselves to
the implementation of the Accord. But some US regulators released the Accord
for comment at home on December 15, 1988.' By receiving comment on the
Accord after they had promulgated it, US bank regulators placed would-be
commentators in the position of only being able to comment on the
implementation of the Accord, rather than the wisdom of agreeing to it.
Similarly, six months after announcing that a Basle Committee announcement
had been "endorsed by the G-10 governors," American banking regulators
proposed it as a rule in the United States and requested comment. 4'
133 See generally Kristen Nordhaug, The Political Economy of the Dollar and the Yen in East Asia, J
Contemp Asia 517 (an 1, 2002).
134 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated
Democray, 24 Mich J Intl L 1041, 1052 (2003) (coining the phrase "agencies on the loose").
135 Porter, States, Markets, and Regimes at 3 (cited in note 28).
136 W.P. Cooke, International Convergence of CapitalAdequagy Measurement and Standards, in Edward P. M.
Gardener, ed, The Future of Financial Systems and Serices: Essays in Honour of Jack Revell 310, 325
(Macmillan 1990).
137 See Porter, States, Markets, and Regimes at 70 (cited in note 28).
138 See Ethan Kapstein, Governing the GlobalEconomy 118 (Harvard 1994).
139 See Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Regulating Capital Requirements for Insured Institutions,
53 Fed Reg 51800, 51800 (1988) for the release of the "proposed rule."
140 See OCC, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and FDIC, Risk-Based Capital
Standards; Market Risk; Internal Models Backtesting, 61 Fed Reg 9114 (1996); Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Capital Requirements for Market Risk, 60 Fed Reg
38142, 38142 (1995).
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Ordinarily, the supervisory decisions of the Federal Reserve, as well as
those of other Federal banking regulators, are subject to a familiar sort of
administrative law review. Within the executive branch, the decisions must be
approved by the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") before
publication in the Federal Register. 4 After being issued as a final rule, "[a]ny
party aggrieved by an order of the Board"-including prospective
competitors-may seek review in the federal courts of appeals. 4 2 Moreover, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Commission ("FDIC"), OCC, and Federal Reserve
rules are reviewable pursuant to the APA. But in light of the way the Fed has
integrated rules promulgated by the Basle Committee, it is not clear that this
domestic judicial review would occur in a way meaningfully related to the crucial
regulatory event-agreement at Basle.
After a decade of experience with the 1988 Accord, the Basle Committee
decided to try to improve it.'43 In January 2001, it issued a proposal for a revised
accord-scheduled to be fully implemented in 2006-that will replace the 1988
Accord.'44 As the committee has explained, the New Basle Capital Accord will
focus on: 1) new minimum capital requirements, with a more sophisticated
weighting of the soundness of types of assets in assessing capital adequacy, 2)
common standards of "supervisory review of an institution's capital adequacy
and internal assessment process," and 3) "effective disclosure" that will, in
141 Executive Order 12291 mandated that agencies submit all proposed and final regulations to
OMB's OIRA for review before publication in the Federal Register. See 3 CFR § 3(f (1981).
142 Review may be had pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 USC 55 1848, 1850 (2001),
or the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC § 702 et seq (2001). See also Interview with a Staff
Attorney, Federal Reserve Bank; Interview with a Staff Attorney, OCC (Jan 25, 2004).
143 The 8 percent standard, for example, has been criticized as an unwarrantedly hard and fast rule,
with little specific justification. See Stronger Foundations, Economist (Jan 20, 2001) (cited in note
130). Moreover, as Roland Kirstein has explained, it creates distorting incentives for banks: "If
the credit cost burden is the same for high and low risks, and banks charge higher interest rates
for more risky loans, then profit-maximizing bank managers are tempted to replace low-risk
customers with high risk customers." Roland Kirstein, The New Basle Accord, Internal Ratings, and the
Incentives of Banks, 21 Ind Rev L & Econ 393, 394 (2002). In addition, the Basle Committee found
itself repeatedly amending the accord-it did so seven times between 1993 and 1996-to handle
unforeseen developments at the time of the Accord's passage. For a discussion, see Raj Bhala,
Equilibrium Theory, The FICAS Model, And International Banking Law, 38 Harv Ind L J 1, 19-20
(1997) (noting and discussing Basle's 1993 Market Risk Proposal, 1993 Netting Proposal, 1993
Interest Rate Risk Proposal, 1994 Netting Amendment, 1995 Netting Amendment, 1995 Market
Risk Proposal, and 1996 Market Risk Amendment).
144 See BIS, Press Release, Continued Progress Toward Basel II (Jan 15, 2004), available online at
<http://www.bis.org/press/p040l15.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004); see also BIS, Press Release,
Update on the New Basel CapitalAccord (June 25, 2001), available online at <http://www.bis.org/
press/p010625.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
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theory, encourage "market discipline. '  The Accord is designed to reap
"important public policy benefits" by "improving the capital adequacy
framework along two important dimensions. First, by developing capital
regulation that encompasses not only minimum capital requirements, but also
supervisory review and market discipline. Second, by increasing substantially the
risk sensitivity of the minimum capital requirements."' 46 This risk sensitivity
places much of the responsibility for weighting the riskiness of bank assets on
banks themselves. The banks use three different models here. One is a complex
set of requirements that obligates banks to calculate the probability of default of
each loan, the loss given default, the exposure at default, and a number of other
risk weights.'47
Substantively, there is no doubt that the draft accord is important.'48 It has
been the subject of a lead editorial in The Economist and has prompted warnings
by the BIS that some lenders will need to spend $50 million to $100 million to
put into place systems that can adequately assess their capital adequacy under the
new scheme-an amount that some predict will put small lenders out of
business. 1 4' The proposed regulations run hundreds of pages-many times the
size of the first accord, as one American regulator has complained. 5° Moreover,
they look much more similar to eye-glazing domestic regulations than to
international treaties.' 5' American regulators have worried that applying the most
145 BIS, Executive Summary, A New Capital Adequacy Framework, available online at
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs50.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
146 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document, Overview of the New Basel
Capital Accord (Apr 2003), available online at <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3ov.pdf> (visited
Nov 1, 2004).
147 The New Basle Capital Accord (Basle II), Hearings on HR 2043 before the Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Committee on Financial Services, 108th Cong,
1st Sess, appendix (2003) (statement by John D. Hawke, Jr., OCC), available online at
<http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2003-51a.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
148 One Federal Reserve Board employee described it to me as a "really big deal." Interview with a
Staff Attorney, Federal Reserve Bank.
149 See Louis Beckerling, New Basle Capital Accord Seen Taking Heay Toll on Small Lenders, S China
Morn Post 5 (Dec 18, 2002); Karen Krebsbach, Risk Management Braving Basel I Storm, US Banker
30 (Sept 2, 2003) ("European banks expect to spend between $50 million and $100 million each
to comply with Basel II" while Credit Suisse First Boston has concluded that it will cost "$70
million to $100 million to implement the accord."); The New Basle Capital Accord (Basle 1I),
Hearings on HR 2043 before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of
the Committee on Financial Services, 108th Cong, 1st Sess (2003) (statement by Benton E. Gup,
University of Alabama), available online at <http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/
061903bg.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
150 See Statement of John D. Hawke, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions
and Consumer Credit (cited in note 147).
151 See id.
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complicated models proposed in the regulations to all of their banks would be
needlessly complicated and expensive; on the other hand, the chair of the FDIC
has testified that "Basel II will confer some degree of regulatory capital benefits
on the . . . banks that qualify, in exchange for their substantial investments in
systems and infrastructure intended to improve risk management."
152
But the most interesting aspect of the second accord for lawyers is how
procedurally different it is from the first one. The second accord has been
opened to serial waves of comments, 250 of which were received on the first
public draft-including comments from banks, self-regulatory organizations,
and other regulators,'53 and 200 on a consultative paper about the accord in
2003.'14 Moreover, as Anne-Marie Slaughter has predicted, the Basle Committee
has continually updated its progress on reaching a new accord on the Internet, as
have its members.' 5 The Fed has devoted an entire section on its web site to
updating interested parties on developments in the revised accord. In fact, the
Fed's discussion of "Basel II" shares space-and is given equal stature-with
the broadest possible categories of supervisory responsibilities on the agency's
Banking Information and Supervision site, including "Actions and
Applications," "Regulations," "Supervision," and "Banking Structure."' 56 The
OCC and FDIC have made the congressional testimony of their officials on the
Basel II process available on their websites as well.'57
152 The New Basle Capital Accord (Basle II), Hearings on HR 2043 before the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong, 1st Sess (2003) (statement of the Hon. Donald
E. Powell, FDIC, available online at <http://banking.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=
Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=42&WitnessID=145&suppresslayouts=true> (visited Nov 1,
2004).
153 BIS, The New Basle CapitalAccord: Comments Received on the Second Consultative Package (Aug 21, 2001),
available online at <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cacomments.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004). IOSCO
has also submitted its comments to the Basic Committee on the proposed revisions to the Basle
Accord.
154 BIS, The New Basle Capital Accord: Comments Received on the Third Consultative Paper (Aug 20, 2003),
available online at <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3comments.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
Moreover, 188 banks from Basle Committee countries, with 177 banks from thirty other
countries, participated in the study that went with the consultative paper. See BIS, Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, Quantitative Impact Study 3-Overview of Global Results 2/33
(May 5, 2003), available online at <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/qis3results.pdf> (visited Nov
10, 2004).
155 Slaughter, 24 Mich J Intl L at 1052 (cited in note 134).
156 See Federal Reserve Board, Banking Information and Regulation, available online at
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/banknreg.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
157 See FDIC, Speeches, Testimony, and Articles, available online at <http://www.fdic.gov/news/
news/speeches/chairman/index.html> (visited Nov 1, 2004); OCC, Speeches, available online at
<http://www.occ.gov/speeches.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
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2. Analysis
Thus, in the development of a new capital accord, we see an attempt to
obtain legifimagy for increasingly substantive regulation through process. To be
sure, this new procedural formality is not identical to the sorts of procedure to
which domestic regulators ordinarily subject themselves. For example, Harm
Schepel contends that "[s]tandardisation procedures have developed into a
remarkably consistent set of truly global principles of 'internal administrative
law."""8 His rather European- and private-sector-influenced view posits that
these principles include:
1. Elaboration of draft standards in technical committees with a
balance of represented interests (manufacturers, consumers, social partners,
public authorities).
2. A requirement of consensus on the committee before the draft goes
public.
3. A round of public notice and comment, with the obligation on the
committee to take received comments into account.
4. A ratification vote, again with the requirement of consensus rather
than a mere majority, among the constituency of the standards body.
5. The obligation to review standards periodically." 9
The Basle Committee's Capital Accord meets most, but not all of these
criteria. Most notably, the committee does not provide for a corporatist-style
inclusion of represented interests in its accord working committees. This makes
its consensus requirements and willingness to review its standards periodically
substantially less onerous as the review and consensus comes solely from
bureaucrats and not those affected by the regulation.
Nor is it identical to American domestic regulation, most crucially because
such regulation includes the possibility of judicial review. 6 °
Nonetheless, I find this development to be striking, for reasons both
promising and troubling. Most surprisingly, there is every indication that the
regulators who first devised these organizations prized their informality.
Originally, a financial regulator interested in persuading other regulators to use a
common standard-perhaps to solve problems of externalities or to gain the
advantages of network effects, or perhaps for ideological reasons-might go
about the task in two stylized ways. The regulator could prevail upon his
158 Harm Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance: Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating
Markets, in Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand and Gunther Teubner, eds, Transnational
Governance and Constitutionalism, 166-67 (Oxford 2004).
159 Id.
160 See text accompanying notes 250-54.
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government to go to the United Nations, or to convene a multilateral treaty
conference, in an effort to develop a centralized body whose standards all
nations that consented to the regime would be obliged to follow. Then, the
regulator could persuade the regime to adopt its preferred standard. Or, the
regulator could, in conjunction with other regulators, form an informal
regulatory organization. If we think of these organizations as informal nexuses
through which national regulators meet to collaborate on international problems,
we can guess at an understanding of why they were so attractive to regulators in
the 1970s and 1980s.
Regulatory cooperation, at least in Basle, is much less flexible, and more
open to public participation. The voluntary adoption of norms of comment and
reasoned decision-making places IFROs within a zone of comparability with the
decisionmaking processes of agencies (with which we are more comfortable).
The view of many lawyers is that some procedure is better than none; if so,
financial regulatory cooperation has exhibited a notable impetus towards the
proceduralization of its products.
I do not want to be overly whiggish about this evolution. It is worth noting
how uneasy this turn to formalization as a means of obtaining legitimacy is.
IFROs remain much less formal than their counterparts in developed states.161
The usual problems of democratic deficits apply, as does, notably, the lack of a
supranational check that serves the equivalent of domestic judicial review.'62
161 This sort of mobilization of stakeholders in an arena in which consensus is sought (as far as
possible) is reminiscent of another venerable, but rarely actualized, concept in administrative law:
regulatory negotiation. In 1990, Congress enacted the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, which
essentially codified an informal practice employed by agencies to form a consensus among
interested parties prior to initiating the notice-and-comment procedure. See 5 USC § 561 et seq
(2002). Under negotiated regulation or "neg-reg,"
[t]he agency selects a facilitator to convene meetings of interested parties. They
will meet with staff to propose rules, to discuss their own proposals, and to try
to come up with a final, agreed-upon rule, including the rule's specific
language. The agency promises to adopt the consensus proposal, at least, if
subsequent notice and comment do not reveal serious flaws.
Stephen G. Breyer and Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law and Regulatoy Poliy: Problems, Text,
and Cases 609 (Aspen 3d ed 1992). What happens in IFROs is not a negotiated regulation as that
process has been (relatively) standardized, but the paradigm reflects interestingly on what happens
in the organizations. See generally, Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 UCLA L Rev 1 (1997). In addition, as with all neg-regs, the organizations raise concerns of
representativeness. The idea of letting stakeholders participate in the process of a negotiated
regulation derives its legitimacy in part from ensuring that all stakeholders participate in the
process. The Basle Committee and IOSCO produce negotiated decisions, but they do so in a way
that particularly empowers the regulators themselves who participate on the committees that
matter.
162 Although these problems are frequently overstated in the case of the entities studied here. See
notes 244-54 and accompanying text.
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Finally, it isn't clear that the development of procedural niceties by the
Basle Committee should assuage those concerned with its substantive work. As
domestic scholars have noted time and again-Laurence Tribe is an apposite
example-it is difficult to draw normatively rich conclusions about the
substantive outcomes of procedurally legitimate decisions.163 "[P]erfecting the
processes of governmental decision is radically indeterminate and fundamentally
incomplete. The process theme by itself determines almost nothing unless its
presuppositions are specific and its content supplemented, by a full theory of
substantive rights and values. ' 64 There is no indication that these international
organizations, or their American members, have defined the values that
collaboration through IFROs is designed to vindicate.
The turn to (relative) formalization that the Basle Committee has made,
then, is an interesting twist of both the intentions of the founders of the
organizations and of what most of us think really matters about public decision
making: its outcomes.
Nonetheless, the ever-present problem of trying to ensure the vindication
of substantive values through mere procedural safeguards should not blind
observers to the implications of the turn of the Basle Committee and IOSCO to
openness.
B. SOFT RULES AND THE PROSELYTIZATION IMPERATIVE
IOSCO's principal achievement consists of its Core Principles of Securities
Regulation ("Core Principles"), which its members have pledged to adopt.'65
Promulgating broadly worded core principles are also how most of the second
wave of IFROs-again, more about them later-began their operations. I argue
that these sorts of declaration of principle are designed not for the regulators of
developed economies, who generally deem themselves in compliance with them,
but for emerging markets. I argue that this function of IFROs-
proselytization-is a second way that their products should be understood. I
sketch the proselytization function through the lens of IOSCO, and I consider,
in the context of the history of that organization, why it has imposed soft, as
opposed to hard, rules on its members.
163 See generally Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
Yale LJ 1063 (1980).
164 Id at 1064.
161 IOSCO, Report of the Joint Forum, Core Principles-Cross-Sectoral Comparison (Nov 2001), available
online at <http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD121.pdf> (visited Nov 1,
2004).
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1. A Case Study and Survey
According to the SEC, "[t]he Core Principles, which SEC staff developed
together with a number of foreign counterparts, represent international
consensus on the key objectives of, and sound prudential principles for,
securities regulation.' 166 The Core Principles are broadly phrased, and generally
represent standards that most of its most sophisticated members purport to
have in place: "There is often no single correct approach to a regulatory issue,"
IOSCO warns at the beginning of the Principles.' 67
For example, IOSCO's principles have the following to say about capital
adequacy:
Capital standards should be designed to provide supervisory authorities with
time to intervene to accomplish the objective of orderly wind down. A firm
should ensure that it maintains adequate financial resources to meet its
business commitments and to withstand the risks to which its business is
subject. 168
The organization's recommended "legal framework," on which "effective
securities regulation depends," is only one page long. The framework includes
bullet points advising the creation of "taxation laws" with "clarity and
consistency, including, but not limited to the treatment of investments"; a
"dispute resolution system" that is "fair and efficient," and that provides for
"the enforceability of court orders and arbitrations awards"; and a "banking
law," about which no more is said. 169
These principles leave room for a wide variety of approaches to capital
adequacy and banking supervision, and the other principles in the document are
comparable.
In addition to promulgating the Core Principles, IOSCO has issued a flurry
of white papers on best practices, appropriate technical regulations, and other
advice. In October 2003, for example, the Technical Committee issued reports
on "Collective Investment Schemes As Shareholders: Responsibilities And
Disclosure' ' 170 and "Investment Management Risk Assessment: Marketing And
166 See The SEC Speaks in 2001, 1235 PLI/Corp 977, 988-89 (2001). The SEC issued a "concept
release" in the Federal Register seeking comment on the organization's development of common
accounting standards, in tandem with a semipublic organization of accountants. See SEC,
Concept Release, 65 Fed Reg 8896 (2000), available online at <http://www.sec.gov/nles/
concept/34-42430.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
167 See IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation 4 (Sept 1998), available online at
<http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD82-English.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
168 Id at 35.
169 Id at Annexure 3.
170 See <http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD158.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
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Selling Practices,"'. 71  and a survey of member practices on "Fees And
Commissions Within The CIS And Asset Management Sector.' ' 172 In this way, it
has evaluated access to markets, capital requirements, clearing and settlement
rules, accounting standards, and more traditional securities and futures rules
among its members and has debated which standards are the most amenable to
common standard setting within its committees.
This advice, however, does not rise to the level of requirement on any of
IOSCO's members. A combination of recommendation plus very broad
principles characterizes the regulatory product of the organization. 1OSCO has
created broad areas of agreement, but, other than perhaps in the area of
disclosure standards for nonfinancial statement information,173 not the sort of
specific standards represented by Basle's Capital Accord.
Its most promising potential initiative probably lies in the way it partnered
with another IFRO, the International Accounting Standards Board, in an effort
to develop accounting standards that could be used in all securities markets, an
initiative I discuss in (slightly-fear not!) more detail below. 174 As of this writing,
however, although a number of jurisdictions (notably European ones) have
agreed to harmonize around the International Accounting Standards ("IAS")
developed by the International Accounting Standards Board ("IASB") in
consultation with IOSCO, the United States has thus far expressed skepticism
about the prospects of harmonization. 175 Accordingly, the dream of a worldwide
set of accounting standards endorsed by IOSCO and enforced by its members-
one comparable to the worldwide capital adequacy standard adopted by the
Basle Committee-is far from becoming a reality.
Thus, its "most significant accomplishment," in the words of former
CFTC chair Brooksley Born, has been its promulgation of its binding but broad
set of Core Principles.
176
2. Analysis
This sort of second achievement of IFROs, then, is regulatory cooperation
as a matter of prosejyliZaion-specifically, proselytization of minimum standards
from developed countries to less developed countries.
171 See <http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD156.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
172 See <http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD157.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
173 See text accompanying notes 97-99.
174 See text accompanying notes 189-93.
175 For a brief discussion related to IOSCO from the perspective of an SEC official, see Kung, 33 L
& Poly Intl Bus at 474-77 (cited in note 98).
176 Brooksley Born, International Regulatogy Responses to Derivatives Crises: The Role of The U.S. Commodiy
Futures Trading Commission, 21 NwJ Intl L & Bus 607, 613 (2001).
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There are, of course, a number of ways to look at the Core Principles and
their ilk. As with the promulgations of the Basle Committee, they do not meet
the Schepel test for adequate internal administrative law.'77 It could instead be
viewed as an instrument of foreign policy-a set of best practices sent from a
class of haves, represented in IOSCO's Technical Committee, to a class of have-
nots, including the rest of the organization's membership.'78
Or, less cynically, call this administrative development the functional
equivalent of an advice column from those who have made their mistakes to
those who are about to do so. Tony Porter has noted that "the difficulty for the
emerging markets of formulating and promoting a position in matters that are
highly technical, in fora that are dominated by the developed markets, and in an
issue area where their own institutions are in a process of rapid change."' 79
These markets and their regulators may benefit from the expertise of IOSCO's
Technical Committee.
Of course, we see a similar kind of proselytization in the Basle Committee.
Principle 1 of the Basle Committee's Core Principles reads as follows:
An effective system of banking supervision will have clear responsibilities
and objectives for each agency involved in the supervision of banks. Each
such agency should possess operational independence and adequate
resources. A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also
necessary, including provisions relating to authorization of banking
establishments and their ongoing supervision; powers to address
compliance with laws as well as safety and soundness concerns; and legal
protection for supervisors. Arrangements for sharing information between
supervisors and protecting the confidentiality of such information should be
in place.180
The Basle Committee has also established a substantial number of ties with
other central bankers and bank supervisors. As it has explained:
Over the past few years, the Committee has moved more aggressively to
promote sound supervisory standards worldwide. In collaboration with
many non-G-10 supervisory authorities, the Committee in 1997 developed a
set of "Core Piniples for Effective Banking Supervision", which provides a
177 See text accompanying notes 158-58; Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance (cited in note
158).
178 Jorge Guira, for example, believes that, for developing countries such as Brazil, "there is little
question that, despite the sensitivity of this area in domestic political environments who do not
like such 'soft law' imposed on them, such institutional development [of, inter alia, IOSCO's
standards] serves a highly positive social purpose." Jorge M. Guira, Preventing and Containing
InternationalFinancial Crisis: The Case of Bra#, 7 L & Bus Rev Am 481, 487 (Fall 2001).
179 Tony Porter, The Transnational Agenda for Financial Regulation, in Leslie Elliott Armijo, ed, Financial
GlobaliZation and Democrag in Emeging Markets 100 (St. Martin's 1999).
180 See Basel Committee, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 5, available online at
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
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blueprint for an effective supervisory system. To facilitate implementation
and assessment of implementation by outsiders, the Committee in October
1999 developed a "Core Principles Methodology.' 1
81
Moreover, the committee "stands ready to give advice to supervisory
authorities in all countries."' 82 BIS supervisors (again, the Basle Committee does
not have its own secretariat) attend a biannual International Conference of
Banking Supervisors, sponsored by the Basle Committee partly for this
purpose. 83 In 2002, the conference, held in South Africa, featured sessions on
two subjects: the implementation of the Basle Accord and "creat[ing] a stable
financial environment" in emerging market economies.8 4 Other, more formal
international organizations have adopted Basle principles. '85
This is international law as the talking shop, except that, rather than being
the General Assembly or UNESCO, these organizations look like the Security
Council. In each of them, the largest, richest, and most important jurisdictions
guide the advice offered by the organizations. Developing countries, on the
other hand, are offered the advice to take or leave. The vast majority of them
take-or at least claim to do so.
Much of this should seem familiar. As a disseminator of standards from
first world to the rest of the world, these organizations look quite a bit like the
ones created by global treaties, to which many subscribe, but, some argue, few
obey-unless the treaty recommends low cost compliance, which the broadly
worded standards generally offer. On this level, the organizations solve
coordination problems, benefit from network effects, and create standardization
by limiting the wide range of regulatory choices domestic financial regulators
face.
For developing countries, then, the organizations' increasingly formally
issued hard rules are perhaps less relevant than their quickly promulgated soft
ones. To them, the Basle Committee and IOSCO are venues through which they
obtain information about best regulatory practices and the common standards
that, it is hoped, will persuade investors from wealthy countries to consider
diversifying into emerging markets. And finally, membership in, or interaction
181 See BIS, The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm>
(visited Nov 1, 2004) (cited in note 23).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 See BIS, Press Release, Twefth International Conference of Banking Supervisors (Sept 19, 2002), available
online at <http://www.bis.org/press/p020919b.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
185 For example, as Sol Picciotto has observed, "the members of the Basle Committee have used
their influence to urge the formation of a half-dozen other specialized, regional groupings with
which it can coordinate supervision efforts, such as the Offshore Group of Bank Supervisors."
Picciotto, 17 NwJ Ind L & Bus at 1041 (cited in note 120).
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with, the organizations may convey to the regulators the same sort of badge of
respectability as participation in more formal international organizations, such as
the UN.'86
This sort of proselytization has met with success, even beyond the
community of bank supervisors, and thus is not without some substantive bite-
if not because of what IOSCO requires, then because of what other entities who
listen to IOSCO require. As the General Accounting Office has concluded, the
"IMF, the World Bank, and other international financial institutions that provide
direct assistance use the Basle principles in assisting countries to strengthen their
supervisory arrangements in connection with their work aimed at promoting
financial stabilization and supporting improved supervisory qualifications."' 87
C. MODELING: EVER DEVELOPING REGULATORY
COOPERATION
1. The Second Wave of IFROs
Although the Basle Committee and IOSCO are the two most established
IFROs, they are by no means unique.'88 Recently, there has been a proliferation
of IFROs modeled on both organizations. In many cases, these two founding
IFROs are members of the entities created in their image. A brief tour through
the second generation of IFROs is instructive in both illustrating the design and
purpose of the organizations and the extent of the phenomenon of regulatory
cooperation that they represent.
186 See Raustiala, 43 VaJ Ind L at 60-61 (cited in note 2).
187 GAO, International Finance: Actions Taken to Reform Financial Sectors in Asian EmeTging Markets 32,
available online at <http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99157.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004). See
also, for example, International Monetary Fund, The World Bank, Experience with the Assessments of
the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation under the Financial Sector Assessment Program 3
(1999), available online at <hrtp://www.imf.org/extemal/np/mae/IOSCO/2002/
eng/041802.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004) (stating that the Objectives and Principles "form an
essential part of the standards and codes work undertaken in the Financial Sector Assessment
Program.... The Principles set a standard against which a country's practice of regulation and
supervision of securities markets is assessed."); The World Bank Group, Evaluating Legal
Institutions, available online at <http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/
evaluatinglegal.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004) (stating that "[t]he IOSCO Objectives and Principles,
with a defined rating system, are widely used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
World Bank and others in assessing the health of the securities markets of countries.").
188 Herbert Morais has observed that most IFROs are concerned with the "preparation and
dissemination of standards ... directed towards self-regulation of the professionals." Herbert V.
Morals, The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs. Sovereigny, 50 U Kan L Rev 779,
786 (2001-02).
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IASB. IOSCO's closest and perhaps most currently vibrant partnership
may lie in its relationship with the semiprivate IASB, which consists of some
government and some private accountants from a few select countries.
8 9
The Board has attempted to solve the difficult question of whether the
rather different accounting standards employed throughout the world can be
harmonized (and, as Beth Simmons has noted, American accounting standards
are particular outliers, both because they are more strict than those in place on
the European continent, and because they are extremely important, as they must
be used by companies seeking entrance to America's capital markets).' 90 As one
former SEC commissioner has stated, "one cannot overlook the potential
expansion of investment opportunities if all issuers could use one set of
accounting standards that would be accepted world-wide for securities
offerings."' 9' As the Board has explained, it "and 1OSCO [have] work[ed] on a
programme of 'core standards' which could be used by publicly-listed enterprises
when offering securities in foreign jurisdictions.' 192
The IASB is organized, however, in the usual style of IFROs: it began as an
informally constituted committee; it was then reconstituted as "a not-for-profit
corporation incorporated in the State of Delaware" in March of 2001. The
corporation was later transformed into the parent entity of the IASB, an
"independent accounting standard setter based in London."'193 It also has moved
increasingly to publicize its deliberations, in an effort, some commentators
believe, to win acceptance of its International Accounting Standards by both
194IOSCO's Technical Committee and its member agencies.
189 The complicated details of the IASB's structure can be found in its constitution. See IASB, IASC
Foundation Constitution (uly 2002), available online at <http://www.iasb.org/uploadedfiles/
documents/8_ l1iascf-constiution.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
190 Simmons, 55 Intl Org at 595 (cited in note 102). See also Edward F. Greene, Hegemony or Deference:
U.S. Disclosure Requirements in the International Capital Markets, 50 Bus Law 413, 418 (1995)
(describing loss of market share of US exchanges to foreign exchangers, subject to less rigorous
accounting requirements).
191 See Hunt, 51 Admin L Rev at 1114 (cited in note 69).
192 See IASB, Frequently Asked Questions, available online at <http://www.iasb.org/about/
faq.asp?showPageContent=no&xml=18 17_24_17122003.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004). See also
Kung, 33 L & Poly in Intl Bus at 474-77 (cited in note 98).
193 See IASB, General Information, available online at <http://www.iasb.org/about/general.asp>
(visited Nov 1, 2004). The IASB, however, differs from other IFROs by including private
members and by its rather detailed constitution. See IASB, IASC Foundation Constitution (cited in
note 189).
194 The restructuring "include[s] changes in the IASC's objectives and strategy, due process,
standards implementation and enforcement, and funding mechanisms." Maureen Peyton King,
Note, The SEC's (Changing?) Stance on IAS, 27 Brooklyn J Intl L 315, 332 (2001). As King has
noted, these changes respond to criticism of the way the organization was organized. See id at 329
n 85; Carrie Bloomer, ed, The IASC - U.S. Comparison Project: A Report on the Similarities and
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IAIS. Established in 1994 as a nonprofit corporation in Illinois, the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors ("IAIS") represents
insurance supervisory authorities in approximately 100 jurisdictions. 19  It is
organized similarly to IOSCO, and, as with the Basle Committee, the BIS serves
as its secretariat. 9 6 Like both of these organizations, IAIS has issued global
insurance principles. It has also conducted research on supervision problems,
provided training and support on issues related to insurance supervision, and
organized meetings for insurance supervisors, including an "Annual Conference
where supervisors, industry representatives and other professionals discuss
developments in the insurance sector and topics affecting insurance
regulation.""' Like IOSCO, IAIS permitted more than sixty observers
"representing industry associations, professional associations, insurance and
reinsurance companies, consultants and international financial institutions," to
participate in its meetings and deliberations.'98
FSF. The Group of Seven ("G-7") recently created a Financial Stability
Forum ("FSF"), "to ensure that national and international authorities and
relevant international supervisory bodies and expert groupings can more
effectively foster and coordinate their respective responsibilities to promote
international financial stability, improve the functioning of the markets and
reduce systemic risk."' 9 9 The Forum meets biannually and currently consists of
twenty-six national regulatory agencies and, inter alia, the Basle Committee and
Differences between IASC Standards and U.S. GAAP 15 (Fin Acct Stands 2d ed 1999). The SEC has
expressed some skepticism about the way the old IASC developed its standards:
While IOSCO is a committee of securities regulatory agencies, the IASC is an
independent, private sector organization. The 1995 core standards agreement
between IOSCO and the IASC did not alter the structure, composition or
operating procedures of the IASC, and IOSCO was not given any type of
veto. IOSCO, through its Working Party No. 1, monitors the standard-setting
process both as a non-voting observer at IASC Steering Committee and Board
meetings, and as one of the many groups commenting on specific JASC
proposals.
SEC, Report on Promoting Global Preeminence of American Securities Markets, available online at
<http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/acctgsp.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
195 See Zaring, 33 Tex Intl LJ at 297-304 (cited in note 6).
196 See IAIS, Oqanization Cbart, available online at <http://www.iaisweb.org/
132_173_ENUHTML.asp> (visited Nov 1, 2004). The IAIS secretariat was moved to the BIS in
1996. See BIS, New Secretariat of the LAIS Comes to Basle (Oct 26, 1996), available online at
<http://www.bis.org/press/p961023.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
197 See IAIS, About IAIS, available online at <http://www.iaisweb.org/132_ENUHTML.asp>
(visited Nov 1, 2004).
198 See id.
199 FSF, Press Release, Communiqui of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Feb 20, 1999),
available online at <http://www.fsforum.org/attachments/
g7pressrelease on_establishmentofFSF.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
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IOSCO.2°° It is run by the General Manager of the Bank for International
Settlements, who "was appointed Chairman of the FSF in a personal
capacity.
' 2°1
Joint Forum. In fact, IFROs themselves are coming together to create
IFROs-second order collaborations between regulators channeled through the
first order organizations that occupy particular issue areas. IOSCO, the Basle
Committee, and IAIS have formed a Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates
("Joint Forum") to deal with the regulatory issues raised by multinationals that
offer banking, investment banking, securities brokering, and insurance services
to clients. In November 2001, that forum issued its own set of Core
Principles.2 °2 As with the founding IFROs, the Joint Forum informally invited
commentary on its draft proposals with "press communiqu6" stating:
The Basle Committee, IOSCO and IAIS stress the working paper nature of
the documents and invite comments which will be taken into account in the
evolution of these papers and in the implementation of supervisory
guidance. The input from both the industry and the supervisory community
in each sector will also influence the continuing work of the Joint Forum in
addressing supervisory issues that arise from the continuing emergence of
financial conglomerates and the blurring of distinctions between the
activities of firms in each financial sector.203
The principles of the Joint Forum, although broad, do matter for developing
markets. As the Forum acknowledged, the IMF and the World Bank suggested
that principles be developed, in part to "help assessors improve their
understanding of the principles and thereby make the implementation and
assessment process more effective. ' ' 204 That important financial institutions such
as the IMF and the World Bank suggested this is no surprise: these institutions
made up the most biting aspect of the proselytization functions of 1FROs that I
earlier illustrated with reference to IOSCO's own core principles.2 5
FATE. The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, created by
the G-7 in Paris in 1989, has issued a set of "40 Recommendations" to combat
200 See IAIS, Who We Are, available online at <http://www.fsforum.org/about/whowe_are.html>
(visited Nov 1, 2004).
201 FSF, Press Release (cited in note 199).
202 See generally BiS, CapitalAdequagy Prindples (Feb 1999), available online at <http://www.bis.org/
publ/joint02.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
203 See IOSCO, Press Release, Joint Forum on Finandal Conglomerates (Dec 1998), available online at
<http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS49.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
204 Basel Committee, Joint Forum, Core Prindples: Cross-Sectoral Comparison 12, available online at
<http://www.bis.org/publ/joint03.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
205 See text accompanying note 187.
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money laundering.2"6 The organization "comprises 29. governments and two
regional organizations representing the major financial centers of the Americas,
Europe, and Asia., 27 It is composed of "Members of the ministries of Finance,
Justice, the Interior, and External Affairs, financial regulatory authorities and law
enforcement agencies.
' 2 8
2. IOSCO and the Basle Committee Together
The Basle Committee and IOSCO do not just pursue their own regulatory
agendas: They work together to create common standards of supervision.29 As
the SEC has noted, "through its membership in . . . IOSCO . . . , the
Commission has been cooperating with the Basle Committee... with respect to
the use of proprietary . . . models to determine bank capital requirements for
market risk.' 210 IOSCO and the Basle Committee also coordinated efforts to
prepare the financial markets for the Y2K bug.2"
To be sure, interorganizational collaboration hasn't always been perfectly
harmonious. In 1991, the Basle Committee entered discussions with IOSCO to
jointly develop a framework for regulation of both credit risk (roughly, the
making of loans)-with which the 1988 Accord had been principally
concerned-and market risk (such as the buying and selling of securities in
financial markets).212 Richard Breeden, then the head of the SEC and chairman
of the Basle-IOSCO committee, ultimately scuttled the possibility of a joint
framework, which he believed would result in drastically reduced capital
requirements for US securities firms.21 3  But on other occasions, joint
collaboration appears to have made a real impact on member jurisdictions. For
example, the Government Accounting Office ("GAO") has concluded that "[i]n
Germany, reporting for derivatives has been further improved by banks,
206 The recommendations are available online at <http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/40Recs-en.htm>
(visited Nov 1, 2004). See generally Beth Simmons, International Efforts against Money Laundering in
Dinah Shelton, ed, Commitment and Compliance 244-63 (Oxford 2003).
207 FATF, Annual Report 2001-02 at 2, available online at <http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/
pdf/AR2002_en.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004). The international organization members are the
Gulf Coordination Council and the European Union. See FATF, Members and Observers, available
online at <http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/Members-en.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
208 FATF, Annual Report 2001-02 (cited in note 207).
209 See, for example, Picciotto, 17 NwJ Intl L & Bus at 1042 ("Efforts have been made to establish a
liaison between IOSCO and the Basel Committee.") (cited in note 120).
210 See 63 Fed Reg at 59384 (cited in note 53).
211 Former SEC Commissioner Isaac Hunt has described the coordination of these efforts, as well as
the efforts of IOSCO more specifically. See Hunt, 51 Admin L Rev at 1108-10 (cited in note 69).
212 See riskglossary.com, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, available online at
<http://www.riskglossary.com/articles/baslecommittee.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
213 See id.
Winter 2005
Zaring
Chicago Journal of International Law
especially through disclosure of value-at-risk estimates that were introduced in
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and IOSCO Technical Committee
papers. 214
3. Conclusions
What are we to make of this proliferation of international organizations?
Joseph Norton believes that "[o]ver the past two decades, the international
financial community has been in the process of devising a 'consensus' on
standards and codes of conduct and a related loose international institutional
framework to achieve financial stability and to develop robust financial systems
on a global basis. 2 15 If it has done so, it has used an ever increasing number of
ever more institutionalized IFROs to achieve these goals. But with the second
wave of IFROs, it is too soon to tell whether the wealthy countries will be able
to agree on a common approach to preventing money laundering or capital
adequacy standards for insurance companies, and so on.
The proliferation of international financial regulatory cooperation is a
recent development-and one gathering increasing momentum-but it is not an
unpredictable one.216 Political theorists have long posited that technical
cooperation by self-interested regulators could expand into an
internationalization of regulation. Neofunctionalists, such as Ernst Haas and,
before him, David Mitrany, posited that international cooperation is likely to
develop along task-specific lines when prodded by domestic actors who expect
to benefit from it.
217
214 See GAO, Financial Derivatives at 115 (cited in note 54) (also discussing the effects of Basle on
Australian, Japanese, Singaporean, Swiss, and British bank regulators).
215 Joseph J. Norton, The Modern Genre of Infrastructural Law Reform: The Legal and Practical Realities-The
Case of Banking Reform in Thailand, 55 SMU L Rev 235, 238 (2002). See also generally Joseph J.
Norton, "A New International Financial Architecture?'"-Reflecions on the Possible Law-Based Dimension,
33 Intl Law 891 (1999).
216 I, for one, have explored the implications of a momentum in this field before. See Zaring, 33 Tex
Int LJ at 323-25 (cited in note 6).
217 Mitrany's classic exposition of functionalism, A Working Peace System, first appeared in 1943, and
was heavily influence by the New Deal, which he interpreted to represent a fundamental shift in
political power from the states to the federal government that had occurred quietly because of the
way the New Deal created specific new powers in task-defined federal agencies such as the SEC
and the Tennessee Valley Authority. See David Mitrany, A Working Peace System 21-22 (Oxford
1943) ("No attempt was made to relate [New Deal reforms] to a general theory or system of
government.... Yet the new functions and the new organs, taken together, have revolutionized
the American political system. The federal government has become a national government.").
Ernst Haas refined the theory (he called it "neofunctionalism") and applied it to European
integration: he believed that technical experts, if linked to effective interest groups, could further
integration on a regional level. Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces,
1950-1957 at 19 (Stanford 1958). His study of Europe substantiated "the pluralistic thesis that a
larger political community can be developed if the crucial expectations, ideologies, and behaviour
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The crucial insight of neofunctionalism, for our purposes, is its recognition
that regulatory cooperation in particular issue areas can, under the right
circumstances, enmesh states and societies in international cooperation. 21 '8 Thus
IFROs grow or beget more IFROs and expand turf as the members of these
organizations see their interests more globally. There are a number of
implications to this process of enmeshment. One is that the growth of
regulatory cooperation will likely be accompanied by a mobilization of, and
interaction with, interested private groups affected by the organizations.
The IASB's relationship with IOSCO is a good example of this, as is the
organization's vast affiliate membership of broker organizations and private
stock exchanges.2 19 Another such implication is that the enmeshing of domestic
regulators in international regulatory frameworks will turn the interests of the
regulators abroad. We can see this in the SEC's annual reports of its work with
IOSCO. 220 The Federal Reserve has also published a great deal of material about
its work with the Basle Committee. And the final implication-a rather strong
claim-is that after these entities are drawn further into the international
regulatory framework of IFROs, a return to solely domestic regulation will
become increasingly unlikely.22'
To be sure, neofunctionalism is a controversial theory among political
scientists-it is, for one thing, very difficult to quantify how much
harmonization the theory demands, and even in drawing together entities such
as the European Union, its predictive power has been hotly contested.222 But
whatever its drawbacks in other contexts, IFROs exhibit much of the informal
coagulation predicted by Haas and Mitrany. Part of the neofunctionalist story of
patterns of certain key groups can be successfully refocused [sic] on a new set of central symbols
and institutions," provided the community was developed from democratic states with
sophisticated economies enmeshed in international trade and finance. See id at xiv-xvi.
218 Paul Taylor identified this sort of expansion in his introduction to one of David Mitrany's final
publications. See Paul Taylor, Introduction, in David Mitrany, The Functional Theoy of Politics x (St.
Martin's 1975).
219 See text accompanying note 67.
220 See, for example, SEC, Division of Corporation Finance, Cunrnt Issues And Rulemaking Projects,
available online at <http://www.sec.gov/pdf/cfcrll2k.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
221 See Zaring, 33 Tex Intl LJ at 324-25 (cited in note 6).
222 See, for example, Andrew Moravcsik, Europe's Integration at Centugy's End, in Andrew Moravcsik,
ed, Centralization or Fragmentation? Europe Facing the Challenges of Deepenin& Diversiy, and Democragy 1,
51 (CFR 1998). On the other hand, academics like Alec Stone Sweet believe that the theory has
substantial explanatory power. See Sweet, Sandholtz, and Fligstein, eds, The Institutionalization of
Europe at 1 (cited in note 41) ("[T]he European Union [now] governs in an expanding number of
policy domains, producing rules that are authoritative for both states and persons. Increasingly
dense networks of transnational actors .. .operate in political spaces that are best described as
supranational in character.").
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a momentum to informal regulatory collaboration turns on what are now termed
network effects.
To economists, network effects exist for those products for which the
utility of the product to the consumer increases as other consumers obtain the
product. E-mail is an example. The ability to get and receive e-mail is worth
more to you the more other people have e-mail addresses on the network to
which you have access. 223 Kal Raustiala has applied an understanding of these
network effects to regulatory cooperation. He has noted that regulators across
jurisdictions may settle on a common regulatory standard: one that permits them
to exchange information easily and broaden the reach of their regulatory efforts.
In these circumstances,
network theory predicts that tipping occurs, leading to an equilibrium in
which one (or more . . .) regulatory standard dominates. Network effects
thus aid policy standardization .... [This is not to say that convergence is
"caused" by network effects, but rather that network effects boost the
existing incentives to standardize. 224
Thus, if SEC and Fed regulators are interested in creating a common standard
with other jurisdictions, these organizations can serve as the fora in which such a
standard is hammered out. Whatever standard is chosen has a good chance of
developing an adoptive momentum by virtue of the advantages regulators see in
being a part of the "network" of regulators applying the same schema to their
regulated industry.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE PROMISE OF THE NEW PROCESS
I do not want to overly complicate the prescriptive takeaway for a
phenomenon that, as we have seen, is plenty descriptively complex. But in
evaluating whether a phenomenon is good or bad, one must have some idea of
what it actually does, and much of what I have tried to do in this article is
designed to describe and theorize how regulatory cooperation actually works.225
In this section, I consider some normative implications of the phenomenon and
site what I have found in the literature of international cooperation.
223 For a general discussion, see Zaring, 51 UCLA L Rev at 1039 (cited in note 6); Mark A. Lemley
and David McGowan, Legal Impcaions of Nelwork Economic Effects, 86 Cal L Rev 479, 489-90, 492-
93 (1998); Raustiala, 43 VaJ Ind L at 63 (cited in note 2).
224 See Raustiala, 43 VaJ Intl L at 65 (cited in note 2).
225 Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin, Judicial Polity Making and the Modern State: How the Courts
Reformed America's Prisons 11 (Cambridge 1998).
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A. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOLARSHIP
Legal scholars disagree whether the paradigmatic limitation of legal
personality to states ought to be opened up in a world where subjects of states-
including agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and even individuals-play
an active role. I argue, at least in areas of technical regulatory cooperation, that
this debate is not fruitful, and that substate actors are both important and
distinct from state action.
I proceed, per an assumption of international relations liberals, on the
premise that international society is disaggregated.226 That is, the interests and
perspectives of the agencies engaged in international regulatory cooperation can
usefully be understood separately from the interests of the states that comprise
them. 227 However, this does not mean that the rationalist parsimony of state-
centered paradigms of international relations should be abandoned. Those
paradigms have much to say about what happens in regulatory cooperation-if
they are refocused on the regulators.
Recognizing that substate actors such as regulators play an important role
in the development of international rules is sometimes thought to be a
controversial proposition, but few international lawyers, at least in this area,
would seriously dispute it. Consider, for example, the critics of regulatory
cooperation. 228 Their concerns about democratic dispossession and regulators
running amok, for example, make little sense if agency actions are inseparable
from the interests of the states to which they belong, especially if those states are
democracies (the calculus is different if the "democracy deficit" is being used as
a shorthand for a First World-Third World power imbalance). These criticisms
depend on a conception of international lawmaking that goes beyond a paradigm
of a state as a unitary actor.
226 See Slaughter, 24 Mich J Intl L at 1041 (cited in note 134); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley,
International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 Am J Intl L 205, 230 (1993).
See also generally Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriousy: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics, 51 Intl Org 513 (1997); Robert D. Putnam, Diplomag and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two
Level Games, 42 Intl Org 427 (1988) (an early and influential model of the ways domestic concerns
could affect the international relations of the state). As William Burke-White has put it,
"[a]ccording to positive liberal international relations theory, individuals-the basic actors in
international society-organize to promote their own interests; States represent some subset of
those domestic interests; and international outcomes depend on the configuration of national
interests." William Burke-White, Communioy of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law
Enforcement, 24 MichJ Intl L 1, 29 n 138 (2002).
227 See generally Slaughter, 24 Mich J Intl L at 1041 (cited in note 134).
228 For a broad survey of these perspectives, see Susan Marks, Democracy and International Governance, in
Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen, eds, The Legitimagy of International OrganiZations 47, 66
(United Nations 2001).
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In sum, I think the liberal perspective on disaggregated states has occupied
the field of writing on international regulatory cooperation.
However, the sort of collaboration wrought by agencies often mimics the
kind of collaboration that realists expect from state-state cooperation, albeit on a
different scale. International financial regulators have designed regimes that seek
legitimacy for their actions with ever more process safeguards. This can be
understood as an agreement to constrain the action that the agencies take in a
way to get interested parties to buy into the process of regulatory
harmonization-a classic observation about how state regimes work.229
Similarly, the proselytization in which IFROs engage can be seen as a
realist, rational effort to create baseline regulatory standards across the globe,
perhaps to reduce regulatory arbitrage.23
Finally, scholars should be cautious about attributing revolutionary
reinventions of government to processes of regulatory cooperation. Although
this cooperation might begin in lieu of treaties, pledges, or other sorts of
international agreements, it, at least so far, has rapidly adopted the trappings of
domestic administrative process. So, even though international regulatory
cooperation is an explosive regulatory phenomenon, it may, in the end, not
create a new way of doing administrative law, but rather a familiar one-albeit
one offered by new international institutions and with broad international reach.
Legal scholars have also recently developed a great deal of attention to the
importance of "soft law" in international relations.23' I argue that the regulatory
cooperation studied here transcends the concept. IFROs represent a classic
version of nonrequired cooperation, but calling it soft law is pointless. Financial
regulatory cooperation enjoys widespread adherence, in the way that widely
adopted models of regulation enjoy adherence in any regulatory context. Even if
it is nonbinding, how does that matter if it is obeyed?
229 Stephen Krasner, who set much of the framework for regime theory, has increasingly turned to
examining regimes as precommitment strategies by states. See Stephen D. Krasner, Global
Communications and Naional Power ife on the Pareto Fronier, 43 World Polit 336, 338-40 (1991)
(defining regimes as solving particular kinds of coordination games by states); Stephen D.
Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in Stephen D.
Krasner, ed, International Regimes 2 (Cornell 1983) (defining regimes as involving "sets of implicit
or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors'
expectations converge in a given area of international relations").
230 As Claire Kelly notes, "start from the realist premise and claim that regimes operate to mitigate
the harmful effects of a state of anarchy by promoting cooperation." Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theoy
and Real Constraints, 44 Va J Intl L 545, 554 (2004). See also generally Claire R. Kelly, The Value
Vacuum: Self-Enforcing Reg/mes and the Dilution of the Normaive Feedback Loop, 22 Mich J Intl L 673
(2001).
231 See Simmons, International Efforts against Money Laundering (cited in note 206).
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Kal Raustiala has recently argued that the concept of soft law makes little
sense in a world where states proceed by either contract-type agreement or more
flexible pledges.232 Andrew Guzman also believes that the concept obscures
more than it helps.233
I agree-to a point. Financial regulatory cooperation would seem to be the
epitome of soft law, but it is much harder than it looks. The Basle Accord, for
one, has enjoyed widespread compliance despite being putatively nonbinding.234
IOSCO's pronouncements are more flexible, and pledge-like, but are also
designed to create a harmonized regime.
In this sense, regulatory cooperation, both hard and soft, amounts to
administration by agreement in a way just as substantial as agreement by treaty.
Drawing careful distinctions between hard and soft law makes little sense where
nonbinding rules can have such binding effect.
Finally, my findings vindicate the international networks literature."' There
is still more work to be done here, but, as I discuss below, there are reasons to
be cautiously positive about the qualities of network governance in international
regulatory cooperation. We must remember, however, that regulatory
cooperation is a phenomenon dominated by First Worlders.
B. PRESCRIPTIVE IMPLICATIONS
Regulatory cooperation is not a phenomenon that will be costless for
national lawmakers to control. The explosion of outlets for financial regulatory
cooperation has, after all, developed in most cases without the ex ante
endorsement by treaty or national legislature, or, at least in the United States, the
ex post imprimatur of national courts.
It therefore is both a fact on the ground and a choice presented for
national lawmakers. These lawmakers must decide whether they wish to try to
develop international coordination through more centralized means, such as
treaties or existing international organizations, or whether they wish to leave the
cooperative process to the informal outlets increasingly offered by regulatory
cooperation.236
232 Kal Raustiala, Draft Working Paper, Form and Substance in International Agreements 16-19 (on file
with the author).
233 Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Tbeoy of Internalional Law, 90 Cal L Rev 1823, 1880 (2002)
("soft law remains largely outside the theoretical framework of international legal scholars').
234 See text accompanying note 50.
235 See generally Slaughter, A New World Order (cited in note 1).
236 The choice is similar to a domestic one that I have discussed elsewhere: whether to proceed
through centralized rules, or whether to permit a regulatory equilibrium to develop through more
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In my view, the decision turns upon the value that legislators place on
coordination. Where the fact of coordination is particularly important, but the
substance of the coordination is not, regulatory cooperation is a useful, low-cost
choice. It avoids the difficulties of the treaty process. Regulatory cooperation
moves quickly and flexibly; national lawmakers often do not. Moreover,
regulatory cooperation, at least in the financial sector, addresses technical and
complex issues about which generalist national lawmakers are usually inexpert.
Regulatory collaboration is therefore appropriate in technical areas of "low
politics," where national interests in unique approaches to regulation are hard to
discern.23 In these areas, there is every indication that globalized administrative
process is by no means a bad thing.
But in areas where mere coordination is not a predominant value,
lawmakers may be wary of leaving matters to the regulators. Because while there
is evidence that regulatory cooperation may achieve a regulatory equilibrium, we
do not know whether ad hoc harmonization will center around the right one.
Thus, lawmakers evaluating the prospect of regulatory harmonization must
decide how much the substance of the possible agreement matters to them. If it
is important, they may wish to act instead of leaving matters to the vagaries of
the informal administrative process. But otherwise, they need not fear that
process. In the remainder of this section, I focus on two reasons why. I show
how the new global administrative process contributes a solution to two
evergreen questions that have long exercised international lawyers. The
questions are:
Are these bureaucrats on the loose?
238
Can this phenomenon be used to constrain a hegemonic power?
239
disaggregated mechanisms, such as, for instance, district courts. See Zaring, 51 UCLA at 1017,
1077-78 (cited in note 6).
237 Here, at least, I agree with Guzman. See Guzman, 90 Cal L Rev at 1885 (cited in note 233)
("[hose areas in which international law matters ... include... the entire range of international
economic issues, from trade to the international regulation of competition law to environmental
regulation.").
238 Slaughter, 24 Mich J Ind L at 1052 (cited in note 134).
239 As Robert Keohane and Ruth Grant have observed, "[a] common response to these new patterns
of global governance is to call for greater accountability." Ruth W. Grant and Robert 0.
Keohane, Seminar on Global Governance and Administrative Law, NYU Law School,
Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Poliics 1, available online at <http://www.law.nyu.edu/
kingsburyb/spring04/globalization/keohane.Grant%20paper.doc> (visited Nov 1, 2004) ("The
most complex issues arise with respect to very powerful states with constitutional democratic
governments, such as the United States. Such governments are accountable to their citizens and
to an array of domestic interests and institutions, but as we have noted, this does not assure
accountability to outsiders. Large and powerful states do not depend on subventions from others
or on markets, and there is no strong international legal structure governing their actions.").
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I offer two hopeful answers to both questions.
1. The Democratic Deficit Problem
Many commentators have evinced concern about whether international
regulatory agreement is subject to control by elected officials and to real
participation by the people and entities affected by the work of these
institutions. 240 This is the democratic deficit inherent in international regulatory
agreement. Some have called for a variety of procedural fixes to ensure the
accountability of phenomena like IFROs, ranging from enhanced Internet access
of the proposals of these organizations to formal treaties ratifying the existence
and work of the regulators.241 Others have downplayed the problem of popular
control of regulators, positing that such control is only one value among many,
including the development of effective policy and the control of multinational
and many-tentacled corporations.242 These scholars contrast the work of
regulators favorably with that of domestic agencies and legislatures. 2 43
I take a different view. Although it is possible that democratic control of
international cooperation is overrated, it is by no means clear that this control is
lacking in financial regulation-an area of regulation mysterious and complex
enough to seem like an almost paradigmatic case of bureaucrats on the loose.
There are two reasons to take heart: the first lies in the procedural
safeguards adopted by IFROs that seek to promulgate hard rules, and the
second lies in the domestic institution that, at least in the United States, carefully
watches the rulemaking process. That institution is Congress and not the courts.
Procedural Safeguards. Bureaucrats have not used informal cooperation to
dispense with process; instead, in their First World regulatory efforts, they have
adopted quite a bit of process. The publicity, comment periods, etc., of hard
rules now proposed by organizations such as the Basle Committee is a salve to
the democracy deficit, rather than a threat to it.
240 See, for example, Macey, 52 Emory L J at 1353-54 (cited in note 13) (for a conservative
perspective); Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of GlobaliZation: The WITO, NAFTA,
and International Harmonization of Standards, 50 U Kan L Rev 823, 824 (2001-02) (Director of Public
Citizen's Global Trade Watch arguing that harmonization through the WTO and NAFTA-
admittedly more formal means of formalization than the ones considered here-"directly and
deeply affect an array of domestic policies, [but] were developed in processes that excluded many
interested parties"). See also Kinney, 54 Admin L Rev at 430 (cited in note 113) ("The greatest
concern with . . . transgovernmental networks involved with international regulation is their
limited accountability," especially compared to "democratically elected governments.").
241 Kinney has called for a confluence of international policymakers and scholars working under a
formally constituted organization-like the UN's International Law Commission-to address the
problem. 54 Admin L Rev at 431-32 (cited in note 113).
242 See, for example, Slaughter, 24 Mich J Intl L at 1041 (cited in note 134).
243 See id.
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No doubt, this salve is an imperfect one, because the comment periods,
etc., are done by the grace of IFROs. But the fact remains that as these
organizations have evolved and tackled far-reaching regulatory problems, they
have done so more openly, and with increasing procedural regularity. There is
little reason to believe this momentum will change.
This is the good news about the legitimacy impetus of regulators who hope
to coordinate around hard, biting rules. There is simply no evidence, in the
financial arena at least, that cooperation with First World significance will
happen without some simulacrum of First World style administrative process.
Legislaive, Not Judicial, Control Moreover, perhaps hearteningly, the
institution that most oversees IFRO rulemakings in the United States is a
particularly democratic branch of government. Federal Reserve officials regularly
testify on the progress of Basle Accord revisions before Congress.2" A number
of individual congressmen have recently sent the American banking regulators a
letter expressing their concerns about the development of Basle 11.245
Congress has also expressed interest in constraining the activities of the
organizations through disclosure and reporting. In 1996, Congress passed the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996. Section 509 of that Act
required the Commission to report to the Congress "on progress in the
development of international accounting standards and the outlook for
successful completion of a set of international standards that would be
acceptable to the Commission for offerings and listings by foreign corporations
in United States markets. 246
Moreover, many congressmen have begun to express concern about the
lack of accountability implicit in the actions of IFROs. One bipartisan set of
legislators has introduced legislation that would require banking regulators to
come to consensus on positions to be taken at the Basle Committee, and, if no
consensus could be reached, to defer to the position of the Secretary of the
Treasury.247
244 See The Federal Reserve Board, Basle II Capital Accord, available online at
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/basel2/speeches.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
24s See, for example, House Committee on Financial Services, Letter to Allan Greenspan, Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board; John D. Hawke, Comptroller, OCC; Donald E. Powell, Chairman, FDIC;
and James E. Gilleran, Director, Office of Thrift Supervision (Nov 3, 2003), available online at
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2003/November/200 31106/R-1 154/R-
1154_73_1.pdf> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
246 For the October 1997 report, see SEC, Report on Promoting Global Preeminence of American Securities
Markets (cited in note 89).
247 See HR 2043, 108th Cong, 1st Sess (May 9, 2003) ("If the members of the Committee that are
participants on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision are unable to agree on a uniform
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That bill would also require the agencies to report to Congress before
agreeing to any regulation before the Basle Committee: "No.. . banking agency
...may agree to any proposed recommendation of the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision before the agency submits a report on the proposed
recommendation to the Congress." '248
As the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee has said,
because "[c]hanges to the Basel Accord will have a dramatic impact on financial
institutions around the globe," the legislation is designed to "create a mechanism
by which Congress can be sure that any changes to the Basel Accord will have a
positive effect on both competition and our economy. 2 49
This developing approach to cure the undemocratic aspects of the
generation of regulations in the sphere of international harmonization is rather
different than the classic ways these agencies are constrained in domestic law: by
courts."' Neither American nor European courts have yet played an important
role in constraining international financial regulation.51
position on an issue, the position of the Secretary of the Treasury shall be determinative for
purposes of paragraph (1) with respect to such issue.").
248 See id.
249 House Committee on Financial Services, Press Release, Basel Bill Would Unifi US Posiion, Promote
Competiiveness (May 9, 2003), available online at <http://www.financialservices.house.gov/
news.asp> (visited Nov 1, 2004). In the future, thinking about IFRO pronouncements on a scale
of hardness and softness might help determine where to strike the balance between permitting
these organizations to develop organically or to check their growth with strict limits on American
agency participation. The persuasion and jawboning involved with the development of broad
principles and the exchange of ideas about best practices seems harmless, particularly to
Americans. But it might be wise to require agencies participating in IFROs to file an annual report
with Congress indicating the potential regulatory initiatives. For those initiatives designed to result
in hard standards, Congress could require advanced notices of proposed rulemaking or issue its
blessing with an authorizing statute directing the agency to develop hard standards with foreign
regulators, if possible. For the Fed's view of such a statute (as well as for a good explanation of
what Basel II is designed to do), see The New Capital Basle Accord (Basle II), Hearings on HR
2403 before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Committee
on Financial Services, 108th Cong, 1st Sess (2003) (statement by Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice
Chairman, Federal Reserve Board), available online at <http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/testimony/2003/20030619/default.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
250 I have found no evidence yet of typical judicial review of provisions created by IOSCO and the
Basle Committee. One Tax Court case has, however, attributed the origins of a rule to the Basle
Committee. See Bank One Corp, 120 TC at 222-23 (cited in note 56). See also Martin Shapiro,
Instituionaliing Administraive Space, in Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz, and Neil Fligstein, eds,
The Institutionalizaion of Europe 94 (Oxford 2001).
251 Although Martin Shapiro believes that the EU, "which exhibits so much Angst about the
democratic deficit . . . is likely to move in the direction of judicial . . .[democratization] of the
administrative process" by adopting some form of the dialogic method of notice, comment, and
lawsuit over the record permitted in American courts. Id at 112.
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But this is not a bad thing. Supervision by Congress is probably the best
hope for any sort of supervision of international regulatory cooperation. It is
unlikely that the lack of supervision by the courts will change.
In fact, it is not clear what the courts could do. For example, although
American regulators expect litigation over the Basle II accord,2 2 American
courts are unlikely to feel comfortable involving themselves in the accord, even
though it will be presented to them as something of a fait accompli.
Because the formalities of administrative procedure will have been
observed rather scrupulously in this case (with an ANPR, an NPR, and notice
and comment on an international level accepted by the Basle Committee), and
given that there will probably be some differences between the final rule
promulgated by the committee and the American banking regulators, it is
unlikely that courts will look closely at a deal that will, in a real way, have been
heavily affected by what has already been agreed to internationally.
In this way, the "democratic deficit" threatened by financial regulatory
cooperation is really only a judicial deficit. With plenty of agency process on
hand, and with the active supervision of Congress, it is by no means clear that
First Worlders should worry about the phenomenon."'
The caveat here, of course, is that non-First Worlders are faced with a
more limited form of participation. Although they are free to participate in the
regulatory process offered by IFROs, they have much less control over the
activities of the Basle Committee and IOSCO's Technical Committee than do
First World legislatures and executives. But the question is, however, whether
this cost is an insurmountable one.
2. Constraint of Hegemonic Power
Other observers of the international scene worry about the role of
international law in a world where one power is so much stronger than all of the
others.2"4 What are we to do, it is asked, in a world where the SEC plays an
outsized role in the harmonization of accounting standards and the like? But the
252 Interview with a Staff Attorney, Federal Reserve Board (Jan 9, 2004).
253 We also see the OECD doing this, at least in some cases. See James Salzman, Working Paper, L &
Contemp Probs (forthcoming) (noting that recent revisions to the OECD's Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises were first tested among a variety of members "like a focus group" and
then "fed into a process that resembled notice-and-comment rulemaking").
254 For a recent collection of the varying perspectives that advance these concerns, see Michael Byers
and Georg Nolte, eds, United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge
2003).
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way that IFROs work-and I do not seek to be new here-calls a strong
conception of hegemonic power into question. 5
Consider the very concept of a hegemonic interest that can be attributed to
the United States. Does it include the interests of turf-protecting regulators (to
the extent that regulators actually pursue this goa125 , the goals of sophisticated
financial institutions who wish to act without constraint, or the perspective of
American financial consumers?
Each of these oxen has been gored by the efforts of 1OSCO and the Basle
Committee. The American bureaucrats who attend IOSCO meetings often
complain about the demands membership in the organizations create.257
American banking regulators have disagreed with one another about the merits
of the impending revisions to Basle's capital accord,2 8 while some American
banks are preparing to (ineffectually) dispute Basle II in domestic courts.259 As
for the consumer perspective (if that perspective is represented by Congress),
Congress has expressed its worry about-and exercised its supervision of-both
255 For a defense of the importance of conceiving of unitary states as principle actors in international
relations-an importance that this paper disputes-see Moravcsik, Europe's Integration at Centugy's
End at 51 (cited in note 222).
256 I am, as are many observers, very skeptical of simplistic claims that agencies attempt to maximize
turf. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law 118 Harv L Rev
(forthcoming 2005) (questioning "the theoretical basis for believing that government predictably
seeks to build empires of either the imperialistic or avaricious variety"); Edward L. Rubin, Public
Choice, Pbenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern State: Keep the Bathwater, but Tbrow Out that Baby, 87
Cornell L Rev 309, 320 (2002) ('Within the political sphere... material self-interest models have
been energetically proposed and convincingly refuted in such disparate areas as voting behavior,
social movement participation, legislative action, and judicial decisionmaking.') However, federal
banking agencies with overlapping jurisdictions (the OCC regulates federal banks, the FDIC
insures banks and has some supervisory power over state banks-as does the Fed, which also
exercises exclusive supervisory powers over bank holding companies), do often disagree over
policies that they each would implement, along with OTS. For a brief overview, see generally,
Carter H. Golembe, Banking Ageny Turf War. It's Not like Wendy's and McDonald's, 17 Bank Poly
Rep 1 (May 1998).
257 Interview with a Staff Attorney, CFTC (Jan 2004).
258 The OCC and the Basle Committee, for example, have disagreed about the complexity of the new
accord. See Hawke, Address at the American Academy in Berlin at 17 (cited in note 44) (noting
the unspecific nature of the first accord). The FDIC has also expressed concerns about the
substantive implications of the accord, while grudgingly supporting it. Hearings on the New Basle
Capital Accord (Basle II) and HR 2043 before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit of the Committee on Financial Services, 108th Cong, 1 st Sess (2003), (statement
of Donald E. Powell, Chairman, FDIC), available online at
<http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/sp19juneO3.html> (visited Nov 1, 2004).
For an overview of the structural reasons for conflict between banking regulators, see Golembe,
17 Bank Poly Rep at I (cited in note 256).
259 Interview with a Staff Attorney, Federal Reserve Board (Jan 9, 2004).
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the capital accord and the accounting standards harmonization efforts of
ioSCO.26 °
In sum, although the organizations do not offer developing countries the
same sort of rights as developed ones (and it is, of course, not clear that they
should), it is by no means clear that they represent "unilateralism"-whatever
such a term would mean when applied to the diverse American economy.
261
There is no particular American interest represented in disaggregated
financial regulatory cooperation. There is instead the increasing involvement of
domestic regulators in the work of international cooperation-cooperation that
the regulators feel obligated to vindicate with domestic policymaking.262 The
evidence instead suggests that the obligations created by these organizations can
result in requirements that "are thought of, spoken of, and function as" binding,
regardless of whether they are American, European, or other regulators.263
IFROs, in sum, move us towards a global administrative law that is
voluntary and created by the regulators themselves. In doing so, it is not clear
that they vindicate the interests of the subtly, or not so subtly, powerful within
their midst. The very existence of the organizations, if their rulemaking
processes are taken seriously, belies the concern about American dominance.
For which aspect of that dominance do they really represent?
260 See text accompanying notes 246--52.
261 See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Information Revolution And The Paradox of American Power, 97
Am Socy Ind L Proc 67, 72 (2003) ("The United States is the only country with both
intercontinental nuclear weapons and large state-of-the-art air, naval, and ground forces capable
of global deployment. But . . . economic power is multipolar .... On this economic board, the
United States is not a hegemon; it must often bargain as an equal with Europe. The bottom
chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that crosses borders outside government
control."); Grant and Keohane, Accountabiit and Abuses of Power in World Politics at 39 (cited in
note 239) ("The diversity of views in world politics means that ideological hegemony is rarely
attained.').
262 John Peterson has observed that in the EU, WTO, and IMF, "supranational policy-making... is
highly technical. In these and other 1Os, experts who share specialized knowledge and casual
understandings tend to identify and 'bond' with each other, and often seek to depoliticize the
policy process." John Peterson, Working Paper, Poliq Networks, ch 1 at 2, available online at
<http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_90.pdf> (visited Nov 8, 2004).
263 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 226 (Clarendon 1961). Thomas Franck argued that the perceived
legitimacy of a rule would exert a "compliance pull" on those charged with implementing the rule.
Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am J Ind L 46, 51 (1992).
Franck was interested in the legality of these rules qua states. His compliance pull mechanism
could conceivably matter even more for regulators, especially now that they act in an era that
particularly values best practices. Although, then, Franck has been prescient, I do not attempt to
apply his work here in the work of prelegal regulatory cooperation.
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C. A BROADER VIEW
This question and others raised by the prospect of financial regulatory
cooperation suggest that the phenomenon, likely to be copied in adjacent issue
areas, and even emulated in areas of environmental law,264 criminal law,265 and
elsewhere, is not something to fear-at least not in the way it is usually feared.
The principal problem of regulatory cooperation is not the prospect of a
democratic deficit, which its voluntary procedural safeguards and legislative,
rather than judicial, supervision do much to ameliorate.
Instead, the problem is a First World/Developing World problem; a
problem where the haves, speaking for the global economy, develop common
regulatory standards over which the have-nots have little (but not no) say.
Financial regulatory cooperation in this way clarifies the prospects of the new
global administrative process. It is a process open to the sophisticated, but not
to all.
Further research is needed on other issue areas. But the case of financial
regulation suggests that the new global administrative law is not so bad for those
that have the most at stake in it now; and problematic for those who will have a
stake in it in the years to come.
264 Although many international environmental agreements are done through traditional legal
mechanisms such as treaties, agreement on biotechnology includes an overlay of informal
regulatory cooperation. See Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl L at 43-49 (cited in note 2) (describing, inter
alia, the development of the International Network for Environmental Compliance and
Enforcement); note 8. See also generally Matthias Herdegen: Biotechnology and Regulatoy Risk
Assessment, in George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen, and Peter L. Lindseth, eds, Transatlantic
Regulatoy Cooperaion--Legal Problems and Political Prospects (Oxford 2001).
265 See text accompanying notes 206-08 (describing a regulatory forum designed to address money
laundering).
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